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Privacy on the Open Road 
PROFESSOR DOROTHY J. GLANCY' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At a time when enhancement in surveillance technology appears to be 
matched by the will to use them, I it may seem odd to discuss privacy on the 
open road. But United States law does recognize privacy protections, notwith-
standing both the advent of sophisticated surveillance technologies as well as 
rejection by some of the very idea of any expectation of privacy on the open 
road.2 Along the roads and highways of the United States, people traveling 
from place to place continue to act like they expect a certain degree of 
privacy.3 These, perhaps naive, expectations of privacy are a persistent reality 
* Dorothy J. Glancy, Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., Wellesley 
College; J.D., Harvard Law School. Research for this article was supported by a grant from the Center for 
Science, Technology and Society at Santa Clara University. 
1. E.g., USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 200 1), Pub. L. No.1 07-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (200 I), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177, 117 
Stat. 2599 (2003). 
2. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist bluntly stated twenty years ago that, "A person traveling 
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). More recently, even Justice 
Rehnquistjoined in the Court's unanimous decision in lllinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 891 (2004), that 
holds roadblock and checkpoint stops are seizures for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
3. Activities of drivers in their vehicles - from teeth flossing, to eating, kissing, dressing and 
undressing, not to mention the ever-popular nose-picking - often seem to reflect expectations that vehicles 
are private spheres. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ALoNG FOR THE RIDE: 
REDUCING DRIVER DISTRACTIONS (2002); LEON JAMES, DATA ON THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE DRIVER IN 
TRAFFIC: AFFECTIVE, COGNmVE, AND SENSORIMOTOR (1984), at http://www.soc.hawaii.edui/leonjlleonjl 
leonpsy/instructor/drivingl.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). Among the many amusing and frightening 
newspaper accounts of private behavior in automobiles are: Katie Kerwin McCrimmon, Driven to 
295 
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despite ever-expanding "automobile exceptions" to federal constitutional pro-
tections against unreasonable searches and seizures and court decisions 
upholding traffic stops. Indeed, lawyers and judges may be more surprised 
than ordinary people to learn just how many legal protections there are for 
privacy rights of people on public roads and highways. 
These controversial privacy rights on the open road take on added 
importance as modem surveillance technologies make keeping track of people 
on public roadways relatively cheap and easy. Roadway surveillance has 
become nearly ubiquitous, as an array of new technologies, such as Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS), make possible pervasive, and often covert, 
tracking of travelers along roads and highways throughout the United States. 
Some of these ITS systems are designed to collect information about overall 
transportation patterns and traffic flows. But others, such as automatic vehicle 
identification (A VI), can target and track specific vehicles and the individuals 
in them. The ITS archived data user service (ADUS) has the potential to 
maintain records of where an individual has been in monitored areas.4 These 
ITS technologies can pinpoint where a person is. They can connect that loca-
tion with other records, such as where that person has been in the past. They 
can even be used to predict the person's future movements and locations. 
What is unprecedented about ITS technologies is the scale at which they 
operate. In part because of funding by the federal government,5 they are 
almost everywhere. Management of such omnipresent roadway surveillance 
systems so that they do not interfere with privacy rights poses a major. 
challenge to ITS and ITS operators. 
Just as ITS and other surveillance tools focusing on roads and highways 
have become more widely available, concerns about homeland security, 
thwarting potential terrorist attacks and combating antisocial behavior have 
stimulated government demand for and use of such on-the-road information 
for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. Finding and keeping track of 
potential threats to public order are increasingly important issues. At the same 
time, in the private sector, real-time and historical information about a 
Distraction, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 3, 2002, at 3D; Aly Sujo, Most Drivers Shred Rules of Road, 
NEW YORK POST, May 28, 2003, at 30; The 7 Car·dinal Sins of the Daily Commute, THE SHEBOYGAN 
PRESS, Nov. 21, 2002, at lC. 
4. A VI and ADUS are types of ITS systems discussed, infra notes 27-33. 
5. Federal ITS funding for Fiscal Year 2004 will amount to $232 million, according to the 
Intelligent Transportation Society of America, at http://www.itsa.orglitsnews.nsf/0/ebbdfa05db4142 
dd85256de9007454a8 (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). All ITS funding since the program's inception in 1991 
amounts to an estimated 80.9 billion dollars in capital costs. MELVYN CHESLOW & BARBARA L. STAPLES, 
NATIONAL COSTS OFTHEMETROPOLITAN ITS lNFRASTRucrURE:UPDATEDWITH 2002D EPLOYMENTDATA 
3RD REVISION, at 20, Table 3-7, (Dep't of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program 
Office, Working Paper No. FHW A-OP-03-178, 2(03). 
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person's travel patterns is extremely valuable to "location" marketers and to 
those engaged in geodemographic6 marketing of products and services. As 
Thomas Friedman has suggested, privacy rights can be threatened not only by 
1984' s "Big Brother" -George Orwell's image of an omnipresent totalitarian 
governmene-but also by "little brother," the private-sector information 
collector. 8 On public roadways, it seems like Big Brother is accompanied by 
a gang oflittle brothers, none of whom has any respect for individual privacy. 
Actually, there are three potential categories of users of information about 
people on roads and highways: two types of government agencies, in the form 
oflaw enforcement and civil transportation authorities, as well as a variety of 
private-sector marketing and advertising companies. With apologies both to 
Orwell and to Friedman, one might call these minders of roadway information 
Big Brother (law enforcement and intelligence agencies), Big Sister (civil 
transportation authorities) and a heterogenous band of little brothers (private-
sector entities such as advertisers, insurers, vehicle manufacturers and the 
like). 
When these three types of roadway information mavens get together to 
collect and to share surveillance information about the location and travel 
patterns of individuals, privacy seems at great risk. The Department of 
Defense's infamous "Total Information Awareness," later reconstituted as 
"Terrorism Iilformation Awareness,,,9 caused public uproar because of fears 
that privacy would be compromised by combining government and private 
information sources. Continuing controversies over the Matrix (Multi state 
Antiterrorism Information Exchange) program lO and the Transportation 
Security Agency's CAPPS III I reflect general uneasiness about "data mining" 
6. See Jon Goss, "We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live": The Instrumental 
Rationality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 EcON. GEOGRAPHY 171 (Apr. 1995). 
7. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949). 
8. Thomas L Friedman, Little Brother, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 1999, § 4, at 17; Thomas L 
Friedman, The Hackers' Lessons, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 15,2000, at A27. 
9. See DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECfS AGENCY (DARPA), REPORT TO CONGRESS 
REGARDING THE TERRORJSM lNFORMA nON AWARENESS PROGRAM, (May 20, 2003). Congress eventually 
voted to de-fund the program in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004. Carl Hulse, 
Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A20. 
10. Jane Black, One More Slapata Prying Eye, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2004. Apparently only 
Florida, Michigan, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Ohio continue to cooperate with the program. John 
Schwartz, Privacy Fears Erode Suppon for a Network to Fight Crime, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. IS, 2004, at C 1. 
11. CAPPS II is an updated version of the existing airport screening program, Computer-Assisted 
Passenger Prescreening System. Richard Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It's Heard of You, 
FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 140. Concerns about the privacy of screening information has caused repeated 
delays in the launch of CAPPS II. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Privacy Issue Delays Change in Airpon 
Screening System, N.Y. TiMES, Feb.l3, 2004, at A21. Dan Verton, Airline Passenger Screening System 
Faces Deployment Delays: Unauthorized Access Possible, GAO Says, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 16,2004, 
at 7. 
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and collaboration between government and private databases containing 
personal information about the locations and travel patterns of individuals. 
Privacy expectations on the part of people on public roadways may be at 
the outer limits of legally protected privacy rights, particularly when Federal 
Constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are at issue. 
These days, in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, privacy rights on 
a public road rarely seem to be found "reasonable,,12 or "justifiable,,13 or 
"legitimate" 14 much less, all three. 15 But rarely does not mean never. In fact, 
the United States Supreme Court has unanimously agreed that stopping 
vehicles on public roads is a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 16 
Even though the United States Supreme Court insisted in Katz v. United 
States, 17 that the privacy guarantee of the Fourth Amendment "protects people, 
not places,,,18 expectations of privacy in some places, such as a person's 
home,19 seem to be more intuitively obvious than expectations of privacy in 
12. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) initiated reasonableness tenninology in connection with decisions 
whether a search has taken place. [d. 
13. "Justifiable" was the chosen privacy-expectation modifier in the plurality opinion in United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), which also used ''reasonable'' and "legitimate" as adjectives. See also 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602. 616-17 (1989). 
14. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322. 336 (1973) (discussing the legitimacy of privacy 
expectations). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001). 
15. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 315 (1987). There are. of course, critics of reasonable 
expectations of privacy analysis. Perhaps the most acerbic is Justice Scalia. Concurring in Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), a case in which the United States Supreme Court refused to suppress narcotics 
evidence against visitors to an apartment that was searched without a warrant. Justice Scalia complained 
that the ''reasonable expectation of privacy" test lacks any "plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment." and is also "self-indulgent." [d. at 97 (Scalia, J .• concurring). "[U]nsurprisingly, those 
'actual (subjective) expectations of privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" he 
scoffed. "bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers 
reasonable." [d. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting in part Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347. 361 (1967». 
See discussion of reasonable expectations of privacy. infra notes 116-29. 
16. Dlinois v. Lidster. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004). 
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The place involved in Katz was a public phone booth. [d. at 348. The 
Court noted, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection .... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected." [d. at 351. 
19. "At the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silvennan v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505,511 (1961). In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), a case involving infrared monitoring of 
a home. Justice Scalia writing for the majority put the matter somewhat more directly by stating. "With few 
exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must 
be answered no." [d. at 31. 
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other, more public places, such as roads and highways. But that does not 
mean that expectations of privacy on public roadways are worthy of no legal 
protection at all. When courts and legislatures recognize privacy rights on 
public roads and highways, usually the circumstances, such as the procedural 
context and the facts at issue, are unusual. Moreover, when decision makers 
decide to protect privacy on the open road, they usually express particular 
concern about the societal consequences of failing to protect privacy in this 
setting. Admittedly, highways typically present unusually "hard cases" for 
protecting privacy on the open road.20 It is those hard cases, where privacy 
protections are perhaps least expected, that are the focus of this exploration 
of privacy on the open road. 
The discussion begins by describing some of the surveillance techniques 
and technologies that can affect the privacy of travelers along public 
roadways. Then the article turns to examine some of the privacy interests of 
people on the open road. The next part considers some of the many types of 
legal rights that protect the privacy of people on public roads or highways. 
The article concludes by addressing the principle that people on the open road 
have important rights to freedom from intrusions and interferences with their 
on-the-road activities. 
II. TRACKING TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES 
Watching people travel on public roads is often described as "fair 
game,,,21 an age-old pastime for anyone who wants to look at the passing 
scene.22 Indeed, people tracking other people as they move from place to 
20. The concept of "hard cases" comes from RONAlD DWORKIN, TAKING RlGIITS SERIOUSLY 81-130 
(1977). 
21. There are, of course, instances of illegal stalking - actively following someone in a manner to 
cause fear. The crime of stalking is discussed infra note 208. 
22. For example, one of Edgar Allan Poe's most enigmatic stories is The Man o/the Crowd from 
his TALES OF THE GROTESQUE AND ARABESQUE (1840). In Poe's story, an anonymous observer/voyeur 
describes how he became fascinated by an elderly man with "a countenance which at once arrested and 
absorbed my whole attention, on account of the absolute idiosyncracy of its expression." In the end, the 
observer concludes that the old man is ''the type and the genius of deep crime. He refuses to be alone. He 
is the man of the crowd. It will be in vain to follow, for I shallleam no more of him, nor of his deeds." 
EDGAR ALLAN POE, COLLECTED WORKS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE, 506, 515 (T.O. Mabbott, ed., Belknap 
Press, 1969) (emphasis added). 
Examples of current books about people-watching range from Dr. Aaron W. Wolfgang's 
EVER YBODY' S GUIDE TO PEOPLE WATCHING (1995) to ROUTE 66: THE HIGHWAY AND ITS PEoPLE (1988) 
by Susan C. Kelly and Quinta Scott. The popularity of webcarns and reality video also reflects the human 
fascination with watching other humans. 
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place seems to be about as old as humanity.23 Even non-human animals track 
other animals, often seeking to prey on them. 24 
There are many ways to keep track of a person (a target, in surveillance 
terms) as he or she moves about in the physical world. Having other people 
physically follow a targeted individual wherever the latter goes is one, fairly 
low-tech, way of tracking a targeted person.25 Investigators sometimes call 
this type of visual surveillance "tailing" or "shadowing." But such physical 
following has practical drawbacks, in addition to its intrusion on the privacy 
of the person being followed. First, physical surveillance is expensive in 
terms of person-time, usually requiring at least one follower (often several 
followers) for each person being followed. Second, once the person being 
followed realizes that she is being followed, she usually reacts by either 
eluding or attacking her trackers. On top of these logistical problems, keeping 
track of both the present and all of the past locations of a tracked person in 
readily retrievable and interrelateable form can pose significant information-
management challenges. These practical problems tend to limit the use of 
physical surveillance to very few targets. 
Advances in technology now make it possible to target and track many 
more people-in fact, nearly everyone on a road or highway. New surveil-
lance technologies greatly expand capacities to keep track of large numbers 
of people both in real time and historically over time.26 Several attributes of 
23. H.T. Bunn & E.M. Kroll, Systematic Butchery by Plio/Pleistocene Hominidsat Olduvai Gorge, 
Tanzania, 27 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 431-52 (1986); RICHARD B. LEE & IRVEN DEVORE, MAN THE 
HUNTER (1969); ROBERT w. SUSSMAN, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1998); 
LAURA BETZIG, HUMAN NATURE: A HUMAN EVOLUTION 329 (1989); J.D. Speth, Early Hominid Hunting 
and Scavenging, 18 JOURNAL OF HUMAN EVOLUTION 329 (1989). Cf Craig. B. Stanford, Chimpanzee 
Hunting Behavior and Human Evolution, AMERICAN SCIENTIST (May-June 1995). 
24. Among the species most closely studied for their hunting patterns are Chimpanzees. Stanford, 
supra note 23. 
25. Nineteenth century Native Americans were famous for their tracking skills. Kenneth W Porter, 
The Seminole-Negro Indian Scout, 1870-1881,55 Sw. HIST. Q. 358 (1951). The legendary Apache Scouts 
may have been among the most expert trackers in American history. See Eve Ball, The Apache Scouts: A 
Circicahua Appraisal, 7 ARIZ. & THE WEST 315 (1965). 
26. Technologies that project surveillance in unseen and unanticipated ways have long concerned 
the courts. For example, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 
(2001) held that thermal radiation scanning (a "technological enhancement or ordinary perception") of a 
home from a public street constitutes an unreasonable search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
His opinion for the Court concludes by stating, "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical 'intrusion' ... constitutes a search" under Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).ld. 
at 34. Justice Scalia explained that when "the technology in question is not in general public use," it is 
necessary to treat its use as a search. [d. After all, "preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted" is what is at stake. [d. His concern 
was, of course, not about roadways but about leaving "the homeowner at the mercy of advancing 
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modem roadway surveillance technologies enhance their effectiveness. First, 
many of the new surveillance technologies tend to be discrete to the point of 
virtual invisibility, so that people tracked by them usually have no way of 
knowing that they are being tracked. Second, use of these surveillance 
technologies is widespread. In part because of federal funding for Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS), United States roads and highways are 
increasingly covered by traffic surveillance.27 Third, the emphasis on 
nationwide interoperability of ITS surveillance systems, together with use of 
digital formats for data collection, make roadway surveillance information 
widely available, interchangeable and manipulable through searchable 
relational databases. Some of these databases contain real-time location 
information. Some databases are historical-retaining archives of the times 
and places of past travel patterns. Others are used to model and predict future 
travel. Fourth, because digital location data is often cheaper to retain than to 
edit or to destroy, roadway surveillance information may be kept indefinitely. 
In the near future, ITS systems will potentially be able to collect information 
everywhere about everybody's and anybody's whereabouts all the time. 
Some of the legal restrictions on use of these high-tech tracking systems 
will be the focus of Part N. At this point, it is important to consider some of 
the many types of modem surveillance technologies that can be deployed 
along roads and highways both by ITS systems and private-sector entities, as 
well as by law enforcement. 
Intelligent Transportation Systems 
Much of the ITS infrastructure is funded and managed by government 
transportation agencies-mostly at the regional or local level-with funding 
coming primarily from the United States Department of Transportation 
(USDOT).28 In operation, ITS systems comprise a wide array of both public 
and private projects, as well as public-private partnerships. On occasion, law 
enforcement agencies participate in particular ITS projects; but law enforce-
ment is virtually never the lead agency that manages such projects. 
ITS technologies are beginning to make pervasive electronic surveillance 
of people along roads and highways a reality. They include various types of 
two-way transponders, remote cameras, license plate readers, as well as 
technology." [d. at 35. This article suggests that there should be similar concerns about leaving people on 
roads and highways "at the mercy of advancing technology," in the form of the new types of surveillance 
technology discussed in this article. 
27. An estimated 80.9 billion dollars in capital costs have been invested in ITS systems since these 
systems were launched as part of ISTEA 1991. CHESLOW & STAPLES, supra note 5. 
28. Within US DOT, ITS projects are usually managed through the Joint Program Office for 
Intelligent Transportation Systems. 
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diagnostic systems and location devices that keep track of the movement and 
locations of wireless communications and the wireless devices themselves. 
When two-way telecommunications devices are built into a vehicle, such 
systems are called telematics. Other types of wireless communication devices, 
such as cellular telephones, data messaging systems and personal digital 
assistants, although not integrated into vehicles, can nonetheless be.used to 
keep track of a person's location both in real time and on an historical basis. 
Together, these technologies can relentlessly track almost anyone or anything 
that moves on public roads and highways. 
As a general matter, ITS does not always or necessarily involve roadway 
surveillance.29 Originally called Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems 
(NHS), ITS technologies were initially designed to be impersonal, in that they 
focused on anonymous vehicles in relationship with highways, rather than on 
identifiable individuals in vehicles or along roadways.3o 
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), primarily 
through the Federal Highway Administration, has provided billions of dollars 
of funding for ITS projects. But USDOT generally does not micromanage 
particular ITS systems much less encourage targeted surveillance. The ITS 
Joint Program Office within USDOT is currently in charge of most ITS 
matters for USDOT. 
On-the-ground ITS projects are typically under the control of local or 
regional transportation authorities. Sometimes these local or regional 
agencies partner with other public agencies, including law enforcement, as 
well as private companies. The TravInfo ITS project in the San Francisco Bay 
Area is typical. It is a joint project of the region's Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Commission (MTC), CalTrans (the California state department of trans-
portation) and the California Highway Patrol.3l A private-sector company, PB 
Farradyne, Inc. designed and manages TravInfo for the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission and its partners.32 The purpose of the TravInfo 
ITS project is to gather and provide traffic information in the San Francisco 
29. The range of ITS activities is suggested by the 33 types of technologies, divided into eight user 
services, bundles included within the National ITS Architecture (Version 5.0, April 2004), at 
http://www.its.dot.gov/archlarch.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). For a complete listing ofthe 33 types of 
technologies see Version 5.0 of the National ITS Architecture, at http://www.iteris.comlitsarchlhtmll 
user/userserv.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). 
30. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, II SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. lSI (1995). This study considered an earlier version of ITS architecture 
which was somewhat less involved in surveillance. 
31. See the Metropolitan Transportation Commission website, at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/projectsl 
travinfo/travinfl.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004); 511 Traffic website, at http://traffic.511.0rgltraffic_ 
partners.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). 
32. See press release regarding the TravInfo project on the Metropolitan Transportation Commission 
website, at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/whats_happeninglpress_releaseslrell07.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). 
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Bay area with a view toward improving transportation efficiency, reducing 
environmental consequences of congestion and promoting highway safety. 
Initially ITS surveillance technologies collected aggregate information 
about traffic flows, such as the rate of use of a segment of highway or of an 
on-ramp or off-ramp to a bridge or tunnel, rather than personal data related to 
a particular traveler or vehicle. However, over time, as ITS programs began 
to focus increasingly on transportation users and their personal activities, a 
greater emphasis on targeting individuals began to emerge. Today a number 
of ITS technologies collect and manage individualized location information 
and origin-destination data, such as the commute pattern of a person traveling 
from her home to her workplace and back. Although surveillance of 
individuals is nowhere listed as an ITS function or user service, many ITS 
technologies focus on individual travelers' activities and locations. ITS 
applications can track the locations a traveler visits and maintain itineraries 
of an individual's past travel. These applications, and the data collected by 
them, are sometimes even used to predict the individual's future movements 
and activities.33 
33. More than half of the 33 ITS user services appear to contemplate collection of data about 
identifiable individuals. These user services include: 
I. Travel And Traffic Management User Services 
1.1 Pre-trip Travellnfonnation 
1.2 En-route Driver Infonnation 
1.3 Route Guidance 
1.4 Ride Matching And Reservation 
1.5 Traveler Services Infonnation 
1.7 Incident Management 
1.8 Travel Demand Management 
1.9 Emissions Testing And Mitigation 
2. Public Transportation Management User Services 
2.3 Personalized Public Transit 
2.4 Public Travel Security 
3. Electronic Payment User Services 
3.1 Electronic Payment Services 
4. Commercial Vehicle Operations User Services 
4.1 Commercial Vehicle Electronic Clearance 
4.2 Automated Roadside Safety Inspection 
4.3 On-board Safety and Security Monitoring 
4.4 Commercial Vehicle Administrative Processes 
5. Emergency Management User Services 
5.1 Emergency Notification And Personal Security 
5.2 Emergency Vehicle Management 
7. Infonnation Management User Services 
7.1 Archived Data Function 
Version 5.0 of the National ITS Architecture, at http://www.iteris.comlitsarchlhtrnlluser/userserv.htm(last 
visited Aug. 9, 2004). 
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Traffic Cameras 
Video cameras that capture moving and still images of roadways and the 
people and objects on them represent some of the most common ITS 
surveillance technologies. Among the most widely used are remotely operated 
closed-circuit television cameras located high above roadways, often 
discretely placed so that they are difficult to see from the roadway. These 
unobtrusive traffic cameras are usually operated and monitored by a traffic 
management center located some distance away from the camera and the 
highway being surveiled. The traffic management center operator has pan-
zoom-tilt remote controls that permit the operator to pan along a highway, 
zoom out to look at the general traffic landscape or tilt down and zoom in to 
closely monitor particular locations (bridges, tunnels, on-ramps and off-
ramps) or incidents (accidents or bottlenecks). Local television stations often 
broadcast real-time wide-angle views from such cameras showing traffic 
flows, or traffic jams. These real-time images of roadways are also popular 
places on the websites of transportation agencies. In addition to television 
cameras, still cameras can be installed at specific locations, such as at 
entrances to parking facilities or airports, at intersections or even along high-
ways. These still cameras automatically capture a digital image of each 
vehicle that passes the camera. 
When these cameras are used to focus on particular vehicles, they are 
part of a group of ITS technologies known as Automated Vehicle Identifica-
tion (A VI). For example, in many states still cameras automatically take 
digital pictures of vehicles, and their drivers, that run red lights (red light 
runner cameras) or exceed the speed limit (photo radar). These digital 
pictures are often enhanced by license plate recognition, discussed below. In 
the future, facial recognition software, that takes a digital image of a person's 
face, even through a windshield, and compares it against a database of persons 
of interest to law enforcement may also become a common feature of digital 
cameras along roadsides. 
When a traffic camera focuses in on an individual person, for example 
by capturing an image of the face of a driver or passenger, the privacy of the 
individual photographed is at stake. Remote television and still cameras can 
also scrutinize pedestrians walking alongside a roadway, as well as bicyclists, 
bystanders or people on sidewalks. Higher resolution cameras can capture 
what an individual is doing, her apparent emotional state, who accompanies 
her, what she is carrying or what she is reading. Moreover, traffic cameras 
with remote control functions can permit unseen operators to capture images 
of the faces and activities of people in nearby buildings, in addition to 
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information about anonymous traffic flows and persons on or near the 
roadway. 34 
License Plate Recognition 
Automatic license plate recognition is a specialized ITS application of 
digital cameras. It is also a type of automatic vehicle identification (A VI). A 
license plate reader takes a digital picture of a license plate, computerizes it 
and then compares it against a database of license plate numbers and letters 
associated with particular vehicles and their owners.35 Often the digitized 
version of the numbers and letters on a license plate is stored for later 
comparison with similar digitized data captured at other times and places. 
License plate recognition is used for a variety of traffic management, weigh-
in-motion commercial vehicle inspections, security, parking, border control 
and other purposes. In the United Kingdom, the recently adopted system for 
reducing traffic congestion in London relies on license plate recognition as the 
basis for charging vehicles to enter central London during peak hours.36 
From the perspective of privacy law in the United States, license plate 
recognition is interesting because most of the decisional law regarding license 
plates has not considered a license plate to be private information. The 
argument is that a license plate cannot be private because it is after all affixed 
to the exterior of the vehicle where it can be seen by whomever wants to take 
notice. 37 However, in France, the European Data Union's Protection 
Directive38 has been interpreted to protect the privacy of a person's license 
plate number.39 
34. A California statute makes it illegal to use such cameras to peer into the privacy of a person's 
home. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8. (West Supp. 2004). 
35. The website of Hi-Tech Solutions, a company that specializes in advance image processing, 
demonstrates the operation of license plate recognition, at http://htsol.com Oast visited Aug. 9, 2004). 
36. The London system, called ''Congestion Charging," has its own website, at 
http://www.cclondon.comOastvisitedAug.9.2004).This site even includes a Privacy Policy. See also, 
Georgina Santos, Road Pricing on the Basis of Congestion Costs: Consistent Results from Two Historic 
UK Towns (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, at http://www.econ.cam.ac.ukldaelpeoplelsantos/ 
trb2000.pdf Oast visited Aug. 9, 2004)). 
37. Typical court decisions denying any reasonable privacy expectation in a license plate include: 
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972,974 (10th Cir. 1989); State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069 (R.I. 1997); 
State v. Myrick, 659 A.2d 976 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995). 
38. Council Directive 95/46IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, 1995 OJ. (L281). 
39. Deliberation no. 96-069 du 10 septembre 1996 relative 11 la demande d'avis portant creation 11 
titre experimental d'un traitement aautomatise d'informations nominatives ayaant pour finalite principale 
la lecture automatique des plaques d'immatriculation des vebicules en movement par la societe des 
autoroutes Paris-Rhin-RMne (SAPR). This ruling is discussed in JOEL R. REIDENBERG & PAUL M. 
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Toll Tag Transponders 
A different type of ITS automatic vehicle identification uses toll tags, an 
increasingly common device used to pay tolls along United States roadways, 
also to provide traffic surveillance.40 Toll tags are transponders, usually 
smaller than a deck of cards, that are capable of rudimentary two-way 
communication. Most toll tags are voluntarily installed on the windshields of 
vehicles by drivers who pass through tag-readers at toll collection points and 
use their tags to automatically pay tolls for use of highways, bridges and 
tunnels. Electronically, a toll tag is a simple two-way radio transmitter 
programmed to respond to an activation signal with specific information -
typically the transponder's unique numeric identifier.41 In most toll tag 
systems, the transponder remains the property of the toll collection agency and 
is licensed for use by drivers. In its toll collection function, the tag is auto-
matically identified each time it passes close to a transponder-reader at a toll 
collection facility. The toll tag reader uses the tag identification to deduct the 
toll amount from what is usually a prepaid "debit" account. The Trans-
portation Corridor Agencies in Southern California have also arranged for the 
use of the toll tags to pay for purchases at McDonald's restaurants. Other toll 
tag purchasing opportunities are planned - such as for parking, car washes, 
automotive products such as gasoline and oil, as well as many other types of 
goods and services. 
Although toll tags can have several different technical formats, they are 
designed to be generic, with an open architecture available to all. For 
example, technical specifications for transponders used in California are 
published in the California Code of Regulations title 21 sections 1700 -1705.8. 
Any unshielded toll tag within range of a transponder reader can be addressed 
SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAw AND ON-LINE SERVICES: REGULATORY RESPONSES 32 (2002), 
available at http://europa.eu.intlcornmlintemal_marketlprivacy/docslstudiesfreguI3n.pdf (last visited Aug. 
10,2004). 
40. About twenty types of electronic toll collection systems are in use, mostly for bridge and 
highway toll collection, in dozens of places around the United States. 
41. Federal Communications Commission regulations regarding these devices are published at 47 
C.F.R. § 15.251 (1989) under the category, "Automatic Vehicle Monitoring." These regulations may 
change with the adoption of the new ITS DSCR standards, discussed infra. See IN THE MATTER OF 
AMENDMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S RULES REGARDING DEDICATED SHORT-RANGE COMMUNICATION 
SERVICES IN THE 5.850-5.925 GHz BAND (5.9 GHz BAND); AMENDMENT OF PARTS 2 AND 90 OF THE 
COMMISSIONSRULESTOALLOCATETHE5.850-5.925GHzBANDTOTHEMoBILESERVICEFORDEDICATED 
SHORT RANGE COMMUNICATIONS OF INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, Release Number FCC 03-
324 (adopted Dec. 17,2003; released Feb. 10,2004) [hereinafter FCC 03-324], at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_publiclattachrnatchlFCC-03-324AI.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2004). 
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to respond with the device's unique identifier.42 So it is possible to follow the 
successive locations of transponders, and the vehicles to which these devices 
are attached, as they move past toll tag readers located at places along roads 
and highways, as well as at toll collection facilities. The TravInfo ITS project 
of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in the San Francisco Bay 
Area has found that a network of such toll tag readers is a useful way to 
collect information about traffic flows, volumes and speeds.43 
There is no immediate connection between a toll tag's unique identifier 
and any particular vehicle or person. But the toll tag issuer typically 
associates the unique identifier with the name, address and other information 
regarding the licensed toll tag holder, as well as all vehicles in which the toll 
tag may be used and the drivers who may drive those vehicles.44 
Vehicle Black Boxes 
It is estimated that forty million vehicles in the United States45 already 
have built into them event data recorders, or "crash data recorders." These 
computerized diagnostic modules are informally called "black boxes," after 
flight data recorders in airplanes. In the future, such equipment is expected 
to become mandatory on all new vehicles sold in the United States.46 Modem 
vehicles usually have several computer modules that automatically sense and 
record vehicle behavior, speed, mechanical operation, emissions, seat-belt use, 
and the like. A typical Black Box is one of those modules - a critical-event 
module designed to collect information about a vehicle in the seconds before 
the vehicle's airbags deploy. 
Many drivers know that their automobiles are equipped with expensive-
to-repair computers. But they usually do not know, because manufacturers do 
not often disclose it, that within the vehicle's computer system is an event data 
42. California Code of Regulations title 21 section 1703(1) provides for a " 32-bit code [that] 
uniquely identifies which transponder is responding to a polling request or is being acknowledged." CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 21. § 1703(1). Addressing a toll tag transponder is called "pinging" the transponder. 
43. See the Metropolitan Transportation Commission website. at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/projectsl 
travinfo/travinfl.htm (last visited Aug. 9. 2004). 
44. It is interesting to contrast the user agreements of various toll collection agencies. For example. 
when the state department of transportation. Cal trans. issues a toll tag. it is accompanied by a Personal 
Information Notice that notes restrictions on disclosure of information provided in the application for a toll 
tag. However. other issuers. such as bridge districts and private-sector toll road agencies, do not promise 
such non-disclosure of the information collected in the application and licence agreement for their toll tags. 
45. Ed Garsten, Auto" Black Boxes" Defended, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 20, 2003, at lB. These crash 
data recorders are standard equipment on General Motors vehicles, as well as some Ford models and those 
of a number of other manufacturers. 
46. They are already required on busses and commercial vehicles, and are under active consideration 
as required equipment in all vehicles. Most black boxes in use in the United States are manufactured by 
Vetronix. See Vetronix website, at http://www.vetronix.comlmain.html(last visited Aug. 10,2004). 
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recorder, or critical-event module, designed to automatically capture the 
driver's speed, driving patterns, seatbelt use, and the mechanical status of the 
vehicle at the time of an accident. Vehicle manufacturers and insurance 
companies routinely have diagnosticians download data from these modules 
for use in analyzing the causes of accidents and assessing legal liability. 
The legal issues regarding who owns and has control over the event data 
collected by a vehicle's Black Box remains unresolved in most of the United 
States, except California. In 2003 California enacted a statute, California 
Vehicle Code section 9951, which provides that, as of July 2004, car 
manufacturers must disclose information about the event data recorders in 
owner's manuals. Moreover, the statute makes clear that the data contained 
in the black box is owned by the car owner. Anyone else who wishes to 
access the event data must secure the consent of the car owner or subpoena the 
data.47 
In the future, whether a vehicle is speeding or its driver is wearing a 
seatbelt may be automatically communicated to an array of roadside receivers 
using the dedicated short range communications technology described· 
below.48 Since ITS industries have already developed adaptive systems such 
as airbags that sense the height and weight of vehicle occupants and then 
modify the operation of airbags for persons of short stature, such as children, 
all sorts of diagnostic information might be transmitted. For example, an 
engineer has patented an in-car system that weighs dieters and counsels them 
when and what to eat.49 Such a system could be connected to vehicles's 
wireless communication systems for transmission to the roadside receiver 
units described below. 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
A number of ITS systems that involve keeping track of the locations of 
vehicles as they move across the physical landscape rely on Global Position-
ing Systems (GPS).50 GPS is a highly accurate positioning and navigation 
technology using a constellation of United States government satellites. There 
are 24 GPS satellites equipped with atomic clocks in 12-hour orbits 12,000 
miles above the earth. Each satellite constantly transmits the precise time and 
the satellite's position in space. From the ground, between five and eight 
satellites can be seen from any place on earth. 
47. CAL.VEH. CODE § 9951 (2003), discussed infra notes 321"23. 
4S. See text infra note 59. 
49. Sabra Chartrand, Patents: An In-car System for Dieters That Weights Them and Tells Them 
When They Have Strayed, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at CS. 
50. There are other ways to keep track of the locations of vehicles such as the cellular 
telecommunications triangulation described infra note 61. 
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A vehicle equipped with a GPS receiver uses four satellites to compute 
four dimensions of position and time to determine the vehicle's location, as 
well as its speed and direction. Standard Positioning systems can locate a 
vehicle within 100 meters. More accurate positioning is available through 
Differential GPS that can locate the vehicle within 1 meter. Differential GPS 
makes use of a differential signal broadcast from a base station that corrects 
for inaccuracies caused by the satellite signal's passage through the atmo-
sphere. Dual differential GPS is capable of locating a GPS receiver within 
one or two centimeters.51 GPS can locate a vehicle for a variety of vehicle-
based telecommunications functions, including telematics and dedicated short 
range communications as well as other types of mobile communications. Each 
of these communications-related technologies will be discussed below. Law 
enforcement use of GPS devices will be discussed in the next section. 
Telematics 
Telematics refers to vehicle-based mobile telecommunications systems, 
associated with ITS. Broadly speaking, telematics enables vehicles, infra-
structure such as toll facilities, and travel information providers to communi-
cate with each other. Most telematics systems depend on GPS to locate the 
telematics user for the purposes of information services, although telematics 
may make use of any of a wide range of different types of wireless communi-
cations. Location-based information services include navigation assistance, 
internet access, localized real-time traffic and weather reports, travel informa-
tion about nearby food, lodging and other services, as well as entertainment, 
such as satellite radio or on-line karaoke. Some of telematics' navigation and 
travel information systems also use advanced geographical information 
systems (GIS) such as digital map technologies to provide directions and loca-
tion assistance. The movements of telematics-equipped vehicles can be 
tracked by traffic managers and compared with historical data about traffic 
flows to assess real-time traffic conditions such as slow speeds due to conges-
tion.52 In some areas, parents use telematics to keep track of teenage children 
while the latter are driving. 53 
Perhaps the best known of the telematics systems, because it is so widely 
advertised in the United States, is OnStar by General Motors. OnStar provides 
51. CHRIS DRANE & CHRIS RIZOS, POSITIONING SYSTEMS IN INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEMS (1998). See also NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, A 
TECHNICALREPORTTOTHESECRETARYOFTRANSPORTATIONONANATIONALAPPROACHTOAuGMENTED 
GPS SERVICES (1994), available at http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov//JPODOCSIREPTS_TEllrOl !.PDF 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2004). 
52. Tim Moran, Going with the Flow; Telematics-equipped Vehicles Feed Real-time Information 
to Highway Systems, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 23, 2002, at 24T. 
53. Joe Ledford, Parents Bug Cars to Track Teens, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 21, 2002, at lA. 
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emergency roadway assistance as well as travel information through wireless 
voice communications with a central OnStar monitoring station. OnStar and 
other systems, such as Networkcar and Vetronix, connect telematics functions 
with internal diagnostic features of vehicles. 54 The OnStar website describes 
telematics technology as providing "a broad and evolving array of safety, 
security, convenience and communications services that are delivered using 
on-board vehicle electronics, wireless telecommunication technologies, the 
Internet and global positioning satellite location information."55 
OnStar Privacy Principles detail OnStar' s gathering of personal informa-
tion: "When you use the OnStar services, we may routinely collect informa-
tion, such as the automatic network numbering information provided via the 
telephone network (Caller-ID information), the location of your vehicle 
provided by satellite and GPS electronics, or any other information, including 
your preferences or usage patterns.,,56 At the end of its Privacy Principles, 
OnStar offers the following assurance: "You take privacy seriously, and so do 
we at OnStar. It's our way of sustaining your trust in OnStar and our products 
and services. After all, your trust is what we value most.,,57 But in the fine 
print, the OnStar Privacy Principles note that: 
While OnStar is committed to protecting your privacy, we cannot 
guarantee that your private communications and other personally 
identifiable information will never be disclosed in ways not described 
in this policy. Subscribers are cautioned that the privacy of any 
information sent via wireless cellular communications will not be 
assured. Third parties may, for instance, unlawfully intercept or 
access transmissions and private communications without our 
consent. In addition, OnStar may disclose personal information if 
required to do so by law on in [sic] the good faith belief that such 
disclosure is reasonably necessary to (i) comply with the legal 
process, (ii) respond to claims of a violation of the rights of third 
parties, or (iii) protect the rights, property or safety of OnStar, our 
users or the public. OnStar cannot accept any responsibility for 
accidental or inadvertent disclosure, unauthorized access or for other 
disclosure as required by law or described in this policy. 58 
54. Remote Diagnostics··the Next OEM Frontier, 16 THE HANSEN REP. ON AUTOMOTIVE 
ELECTRONICS, Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 1. 
55. OnStar Privacy Principles located on the OnStarwebsite, at http://www.onstar.com/us_english! 
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OnStar is fairly typical with regard to the types of information used in its 
telematics services. It is somewhat unusual in expressing concern about the 
privacy of telematics users. 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) 
Q 
A Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Report and Order 
released in February 2004 is likely to enhance and expand telematics in the 
United States. The FCC Order allocates to Intelligent Transportation Systems 
radio frequencies between 5.850 and 5.925 GHz and adopts the ASTM E22I3-
03 (ASTM-DSRC) communications standard that extends wi-fi (IEEE 
standards 802.11 and 802. 11 a) to vehicles traveling at high speeds.59 These 
DSRC communications involve On-board Units (OBUs) associated with GPS 
automatic location equipment. OBUs are designed to be carried in moving 
vehicles. The FCC rule contemplates both communications between OBUs 
in nearby vehicles and communications between OBUs and Roadside Units 
(RSUs) located along roads and highways. 
Most OBUs will be built into vehicles, although portable versions are 
also contemplated in the form of digital assistants and even smart tags on 
products and packages. In fact, the United States Department of Transpor-
tation has for some time considered requiring OBU devices as standard 
equipment on all vehicles sold in the United States. An OBU is a two-way 
radio transceiver, built into or carried in a vehicle. The OBU is designed to 
communicate automatically with DSRC-equipped roadside units as well as 
with other vehicles equipped with OBUs. Automatic communications 
between vehicles equipped with OBUs will enable automatic crash avoidance 
and automatic warning of dangerous lane changes before one vehicle changes 
lanes into the path of another on-coming vehicle. The FCC rule also appears 
to contemplate a variety of other short-range communications between 
vehicles over an open wi-fi band. OBUs will not require special FCC licenses, 
so long as they are interoperable with the 802.II-based communication 
standard adopted for ITS. 
RSUs located along roadways will communicate with OBUs through 
antennas located up to 45 feet above the roadway. RSUs will be licensed on 
a non-exclusive basis for a geographic area, on a first-come first-served basis. 
RSU transmitters are allowed to have up to 30 watts of power and the capacity 
to send and receive communications from about 5 feet to about 3,000 feet. 
Nationwide licenses will be available, but only for designated geographic 
areas that are claimed in a particular RSU registration. Public safety com-
munications will have priority; but bandwidth will be available to commercial 
59. FCC 03-324, supra note 41. 
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RSUs in the order of their registrations with the FCC. Although the FCC 
claims that roadway safety is the main motivation for the ITS DSRC 
allocation, commercial applications, including a wide variety of telematics 
services, such as location-based commerce and travel services, are likely to 
bring location-specific advertising and travel information into OBU-equipped 
vehicles. OBUs witt also be associated with payment systems so that they will 
ultimately replace toll tags for access to toll facilities and for other payment 
purposes. 
Among the interesting features of the FCC's authorization of DSRC for 
ITS is the absence of any mention of standards or controls with regard to the 
privacy or security of the information transmitted. Right now this new 
vehicle-centered application of wireless communications technology is 
intentionally wide open to the development of competing systems. However, 
that very openness can pose risks, such as intrusion and misuse of personal 
information, that affect the privacy of people who use vehicles equipped with 
OBUs. 
Wireless Communications 
Highly popular and not limited to use on the road, wireless mobile tele-
communications are essential components of existing vehicle-based tele-
matics. Independently of telematics, cellular telephones, wi-fi and bluetooth 
devices are frequently used by drivers and pedestrians. An invisible function 
of these wireless telecommunications devices is their legally required capacity 
to pinpoint the location of each mobile telecommunications device. 
The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 designated 
"911" as the nation-wide emergency telephone number for wireless, as well 
as wireline, telephones. That statute also contained an E911 mandate requir-
ing wireless carriers to be able to locate wireless 911 callers for emergency 
services purposes.60 FCC regulations require wireless carriers to have 95 
percent of their subscribers using location-capable handsets (either by incor-
porating GPS in handsets or by network-based triangulation) by December 31, 
2005.61 The resulting information about the location of wireless communica-
tions users is called Automatic Location Information (ALD. ALI is to be used 
by wireless carriers for making automatic connections between a located 
wireless device and emergency services. ALI is also available to law 
enforcement under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 
18 U.S.c. § 2522 and 47 U.S.c. §§ 229,1001-101062 as modified by the USA 
60. 47 U.S.C. § 25 I (e) (2001). 
61. 47 C.F.R. § 20. I 8(g)(1 )(v) (2003). These regulations require location accuracy to be better than 
300 meters for almost all calls. and better than 150 meters for two-thirds of all calls. 
62. Cell phone records have been successfully used as evidence in criminal cases. See. e.g .• United 
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PATRIOT Act.63 Legal restrictions on the use of this location information 
derived from wireless telecommunications are discussed below.64 
Data Archives 
The potential for storing itineraries of the locations to and from which a 
person has traveled in the past is embraced by one of the newer ITS user 
services - Archived Data User Service (ADUS).65 Transportation planners use 
origin-destination information to predict future transportation demands in 
designing highways and public transit systems. But marketing companies also 
use such information to predict future travel and purchasing decisions. 
Moreover, advertisers use such information to construct profiles for targeted 
advertising. ITS Archived Data User Services are designed to collect and 
retain transportation data for longitudinal studies of traffic patterns regarding 
particular locations or transportation segments over time. At present, ADUS 
technologies do not focus on collecting and storing individual itineraries of 
particular persons. 
But there is likely to be demand, backed by substantial financial 
resources, for such individualized travel-pattern information in the future. 
Marketing organizations would find archives of individualized information 
highly valuable in consumer profiling. Divorce lawyers have already indi-
cated keen interest in such historical data. Law Enforcement agencies also 
will be likely to find such archived itineraries useful, for example, in placing 
a suspect at or near the scene of a crime. Moreover, intelligence agencies may 
seek such information for homeland security purposes. For example, archives 
of individual data derived from ITS systems would be a highly sought-after 
States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
63. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
64. See discussion in text infra notes 302-11. 
65. According to the ITS National Architecture 5.0, Section 7.1 ADUS data is managed by an 
Archived Data Management System that "collects, archives, manages, and distributes data generated from 
ITS sources for use in transportation administration, policy evaluation, safety, planning, performance 
monitoring, program assessment, operations, and research applications. The data received is formatted, 
tagged with attributes that define the data source, conditions under which it was collected, data 
transformations, and other information (i.e. meta data) necessary to interpret the data. The subsystem can 
fuse ITS generated data with data from non-ITS sources and other archives to generate information products 
utilizing data from multiple functional areas, modes, and jurisdictions. The subsystem prepares data 
products that can serve as inputs to Federal, State, and local data reporting systems. This subsystem may 
be implemented in many different ways. It may reside within an operational center and provide focused 
access to a particular agency's data archives. Alternatively, it may operate as a distinct center that collects 
data from multiple agencies and sources and provides a general data warehouse service for a region." 
Archived Data Management System, ITS National Architecture 5.0, at http://www.iteris.comlitsarchlhtrnll 
entity/adms_b.htm (last visited Aug. 10,2004). 
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component of such data aggregation efforts as TIA or CAPPS II, discussed 
above.66 
Law Enforcement Surveillance Technologies 
For a long time, law enforcement agencies have used an array of sur-
veillance techniques in their efforts to find, catch and convict criminal 
suspects.67 These surveillance techniques, used both for criminal law enforce-
ment and for intelligence purposes, include physical tracking on the ground 
or by aircraft. On the technological side, probably the most frequently used 
law enforcement surveillance technology is the electronic tracking device, 
actually a group of technologies that includes "beepers" and related devices, 
such as GPS. Recently, law enforcement has begun to use automatic location 
information from wireless telecommunications, as well. Most of these 
technologies are designed to facilitate tracking a target who remains unaware 
of being tracked. Two other law enforcement tracking technologies, photo 
radar and photo red light, are often used openly to deter traffic violations such 
as speeding and running red lights. 
Electronic Tracking Devices 
Federal electronic surveillance laws describe an electronic tracking 
device as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of 
the movement of a person or object.,,68 The Senate Report explains the use of 
electronic tracking devices, such as beeper transponders, which the Report 
defines as: 
66. See text supra notes 10-12. 
67. Before the advent of the automobile. law enforcement agents and agencies hunted down 
highwaymen and bandits who made surface transportation difficult and dangerous. See, e.g., The 
Highwayman's Case (Everet v. Williams), 35 L.Q.REV. (July 1893), available at http://www.hosteny.coml 
funcaseslhighwayman.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2004). 
The romantic side of highwaymen and pursuit of them by law enforcement is captured in Alfred 
Noyes' famous early twentieth century poem, The Highwayman. The landlord's black-eyed daughter, Bess, 
is ultimately used by the Red-Coat soldiers to snare the highwayman who vows to return to her: 
"One Kiss, my bonny sweetheart, I'm after a prize to-night, 
But I shall be back with the yellow gold before the morning light; 
Yet if they press me sharply, and harry me through the day, 
Then look for me by moonlight, 
Watch for me by moonlight, 
I'll come to thee by moonlight, though hell should br the way." 
ALFRED NOYES, THE HIGHWAYMAN (Stanza V) (Charles Keeping, Oxford University Press. 1983). 
available at http://www.potw.orglarchivelpotw85.html(last visited Aug. 10,2004). 
68. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 108(b), 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2001). This 
definition is broad enough to encompass toll tags, as well as the beepers and GPS devices more frequently 
used by law enforcement. 
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one-way radio communication devices that emit a signal on a specific 
radio frequency. This signal can be received by special tracking 
equipment, and allows the user to trace the geographical location of 
the transponder. Such "homing" devices are used by law enforcement 
personnel to keep track of the physical whereabouts of the sending 
unit, which might be placed in an automobile, on a person, or in some 
other item.69 
315 
Because they do not intercept the content of communications, electronic 
tracking devices are exempt from most restrictions on law enforcement use of 
electronic surveillance.70 Rather they are governed by 18 U.S.c. § 3117, 
which provides for warrants authorizing the installation and monitoring of 
electronic tracking devices.7l 
Beepers 
Law enforcement use of beeper72 transmitters became widespread by the 
second half of the twentieth century. Attached to a person or object, such as 
a vehicle, so that the person or object can be followed from a remote location, 
beepers are simple and relatively inexpensive devices. Usually a beeper takes 
the form of a battery-operated one-way transmitter that continuously emits an 
electronic signal that is inaudible at the place from which the signal is 
transmitted. Beepers are often quite small-usually smaller than toll-tag 
transponders. They can be attached to a vehicle in a hidden spot, perhaps 
under a bumper, or placed in a container or even on a person. Miniaturized 
beepers, about the size of a capsule are sometimes implanted in pets, and even 
people (such as Alzheimer patients), to help find the persons or pets, should 
they become lost. 
In law enforcement investigations, agents attach a beeper to someone or 
something they want to track from a remote monitoring post or a patrol 
vehicle. A receiver operator located away from the target, and unseen by the 
targeted person follows the electronic signal continuously emitted from the 
transponder. The direction and distance from which the signal comes, as the 
69. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3117. These tracking device warrants issued under Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure Rule 41, may provide for use of the tracking devices outside the geographical jurisdiction of the 
authorizing court. 
72. Beepers are distinguished from bugs because beepers only indicate the location of the signal-
emitting transmitter. Beepers do not have the capacity to overhear conversations or intercept 
communications. "Bugs" and "bugging" normally refer to hidden microphones used to surreptitiously hear 
and record conversations near the location of the microphone by remote listeners or recorders. 
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signal moves from place to place, is indicated by varying frequencies of beeps 
heard by the operator. These sounds gave rise to the name, "beeper." Beepers 
are often used when visual surveillance either does not work or is intermit-
tently lost in following a target. In United States v. Knotts, 73 the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the use of such beepers as an aid to visual 
surveillance.74 Later in United States v. Karo,75 the Court limited the use of 
beepers to areas outside the home.76 According to the Court's opinion in 
Karo, monitoring a beeper becomes a search under the Fourth Amendment 
when it reveals "a critical fact about the interior" of a home that could not 
have been obtained by visual surveillance.77 As will be discussed in more 
detail below, when they are followed on the open road, beepers generally do 
not raise Fourth Amendment issues.78 
With the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 
1986, federal electronic surveillance statutes 79 explicitly recognized the use 
of beepers and other electronic tracking devices.80 According to the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals in United States v. Gbemisoia, 8 1 the sole 
function of the electronic tracking device section (§ 3117) of the electronic 
surveillance statute is to authorize monitoring of electronic devices, such as 
beepers, outside the jurisdiction of the authorizing judicial officer. Such 
beeper warrants were an early example of "roving warrants" which became 
controversial when the USA PATRIOT Act authorized extension of roving 
warrants to agencies gathering foreign intelligence. 82 
GPS Devices 
Global Positioning System (GPS) devices used by law enforcement 
agencies are small, but usually larger than beepers. They contain not only a 
73. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
74. [d. 
75. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). See also United States v. Application of the United States for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation, Monitoring, Maintaining, Repairing, & Removing of Elec. Transmitting 
Devices & Infra-Red Tracking Devices on or Within a White Ford Truck, 155 F.R.D. 401 (D. Mass. 1994). 
76. Karo, 486 U.S. at 715. 
77. /d. 
78. See text infra notes 172-93. 
79. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2001). 
81. 225 F.3d 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) cert denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000). Gbemisola involved a beeper 
hidden in an international shipment of heroin hidden in ceramic pots. [d. at 755. A vehicle (taxi) was only 
tangentially involved in the investigation. See id. A California Court of Appeal made a similar ruling in 
a similar beeper case involving importation of heroin that only incidentally involved a vehicle. People v. 
Salih, 219 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
82. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 206, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2001). 
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GPS satellite communications function that pinpoints the device's location.83 
They also contain computerized recording devices, or logs. Law enforcement 
agents attach a GPS device to the underside of a vehicle, in a place where it 
will not be noticed. From then on the device automatically keeps a detailed 
time and place itinerary of everywhere the vehicle travels and when and how 
long it remains at various locations. Later, law enforcement agents remove 
the device and download the detailed itinerary of where and when the vehicle 
has traveled. Unlike beepers, GPS devices do not require continuous 
monitoring by a law enforcement agent. 84 
In a murder case involving a father prosecuted for the murder of his 
daughter, whose body remained hidden for a substantial period of time, the 
Washington Supreme Court described police use of a GPS device. 85 The 
defendant was not informed about the GPS devices that, pursuant to warrants, 
had been connected to the 12-volt electrical systems of his vehicles while the 
vehicles were impounded by police. Based on information from the devices, 
police tracked the vehicles to two locations where evidence of the murder and 
the body of the victim were eventually found several weeks after the murder. 
The court explained that, "Use of the GPS devices allowed the vehicles' 
positions to be precisely tracked when the data from the devices was down-
loaded."86 GPS devices facilitate automatic tracking by electronic means, 
obviating the need for human trackers. 
As noted earlier, vehicle owners often voluntarily install GPS devices a 
part of telematics systems for travel assistance and emergency purposes. If a 
GPS-equipped vehicle is stolen, the device can be useful in retrieving the 
vehicle. In a number of successful prosecutions for car theft, stolen vehicles 
were located through GPS systems voluntarily installed in vehicles by their 
owners.87 
83. See discussion of GPS supra notes 50-51. 
84. In a case involving a prosecution for cultivating marijuana in a National Forest, Drug 
Enforcement agents used both a beeper (a Birddog 300) and a GPS device on a defendant's vehicle. United 
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 
85. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2(03). The facts of this case and the use of GPS 
monitoring are comparable to similar aspects of the California prosecution of Scott Peterson for the murder 
of his wife and unborn son. Peterson was tracked from January to April 2003 through a GPS device 
attached to several of Peterson's vehicles. Information from the devices that showed that Peterson had 
made repeated trips to the place where the victim's bodies were later found, was admitted at trial. Stacy 
Finz et al., Groundbreaking Ruling in Peterson Trial; Tracking Device Evidence Can Be Presented, S.P. 
CHRON., Feb. 18,2004, at All. 
86. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 257. 
87. E.g., Hicks v. State, 852 So. 2d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2(03); State v. Morton, 81 P.3d 461 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2(03); State v. Bailey, 577 S.E.2d 683 (N.C. Ct. App. 2(03). Each of these cases involved 
use of the GPS aspects of an OnStar telematics system. 
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Wireless Telecommunications 
Wireless Telecommunications and the automatic location information 
required as part of wireless telecommunications services88 are also available 
to law enforcement for tracking purposes. A recent decision upholding law 
enforcement's tracking of suspects through wireless communications is United 
States v. Forest. 89 The Sixth Circuit approved Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) agents' controversial surveillance technique that found and 
followed drug suspects by calling a cellular telephone in the vehicle in which 
the drug dealers were making their rounds. Since cellular telephones seem to 
be standard equipment for drug dealers, the DEA agents repeatedly called the 
cell phone, but hung up before the phone rang. Even without ringing the cell 
phone, the calls generated "cell-site data" that allowed the agents to find and 
to follow the suspects, partly through visual surveillance and partly through 
tracking the cell site data. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that law 
enforcement use of the cellular telephone site data indicating the suspects's 
location was not a tracking device, nor did use of the cell-site location data 
involve interception of communications protected under the federal electronic 
surveillance laws.90 
Photo Radar and Photo Red Light 
Photo radar and its companion technology, photo red light, are applica-
tions of remote camera and license plate recognition systems discussed above. 
They represent an automated approach to enforcement of traffic laws. Both 
photo radar and photo red light use digital cameras to automatically generate 
traffic tickets for speeding and red light running, respectively. These 
automated traffic tickets usually contain digital pictures of the traffic violation 
and of the offending driver as he or she appears through the windshield at the 
time of the violation. These automatic tickets also usually include a digitized 
picture of the license plate, since license plate recognition is used to connect 
the vehicle's license plate to the name and address of the vehicle's registered 
owner. So far, this automated traffic law enforcement does not rely on facial 
recognition, such as the controversial Facelt software.91 But in the future, 
88. See text, supra notes 60-61. 
89. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
90. But see, Company v. United States (In re United States), 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). The 
Ninth Circuit did not reach the electronic surveillance issues. [d. Instead, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that requested law enforcement use of a telematics communication system for the purpose of 
intercepting communications taking place in the telematics-equipped car was improper because it interfered 
with the emergency response features of the telematics communication system. [d. 
91. Facelt software, Identix, Inc. website, a! http://www.identix.comlproductslpro_sdks_multi.html 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2004). 
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such automated facial recognition technology may be added, if it is found to 
be sufficiently accurate in this context. 
Red light cameras and photo radar are often combined into a system of 
automatic traffic enforcement.92 The automatic surveillance cameras can be 
either autonomous units at fixed sites, or under the control of an officer in a 
patrol car. The digital cameras may be hidden, or may be visible and even 
accompanied by warning signs that photo radar or photo red light technologies 
are in use. The units are programmed to capture images only when a traffic 
violation, such as running a red light or speeding, occurs. Triggered by such 
a violation, the camera automatically records the violation and its perpetrator 
and then sends the digital information to a processing center for the automatic 
generation of a traffic citation. The citation may even be automatically 
addressed and mailed to the registered owner of the vehicle, who is presumed 
to be the perpetrator. The entire traffic enforcement process is almost un-
touched by human hands. 
When red light and photo radar cameras are located at highly visible 
fixed sites or are accompanied by signs giving notice of the cameras' 
presence, they are used to deter traffic infractions by emphasizing the likeli-
hood of being caught. High visibility cameras are often used to discourage 
speeding in school zones or running red lights at particularly dangerous inter-
sections where fatalities have occurred in the past. A typical high-visibility 
deterrence technique combines a portable photo radar unit with a variable 
message sign that informs drivers about just how fast they are driving in a 
restricted speed zone. As might be expected, several states have outlawed the 
use of photo radar as unfair, or as "just not sporting" as some photo radar 
opponents often put it. 
These are just some of the broad array of technologies available to 
intelligence agencies and law enforcement for use in finding and tracking 
people on the open road. From electronic tracking devices, such as beepers 
and GPS devices, to cell phones and even photo radar, law enforcement is 
well-equipped technologically to track people on the open road. Law 
enforcement agents are likely also to be allowed to access information from 
non-law enforcement systems, such as information generated by toll tags and 
other aspects of ITS. In fact, the USA PATRIOT Act was designed to provide 
law enforcement more ready access to just such records.93 
92. A typical combined system of this type is illustrated at the Redflex Holding Limited website, 
at http://www.redflex.com (last visited Aug. 10,2004). 
93. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 206, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (2001). 
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III. PRIVACY INTERESTS ON THE OPEN ROAD 
Since where a person is located reflects who that person is, individuals 
are concerned when somebody else scrutinizes their whereabouts. Individual 
privacy is affected when others keep track of a person as she or he moves 
about in physical space on public roads. A person's location and travel 
patterns reveal the person's activities, associations and what he or she 
considers important. The technologies discussed in the previous section can 
follow an individual's every movement on public roadways in real time on a 
continuous· basis. Often this scrutiny is unseen by the individual. But the 
possibility of scrutiny is omnipresent. As a result, individuals have no way. of 
knowing whether or when their activities are being watched. 
. Logically, activities that are open to sight and hearing, such as traveling 
on a public road, do not seem to be very private.· And yet even out on the open 
road certain privacy interests remain significant. Understanding the privacy 
interests affected when a person's on-the-road activities are, or can be, tracked 
and recorded requires looking beyond what appears to be a surface contradic-
tion between privacy and the open road. 
The moral philosopher, Jeffrey Reiman examined the privacy interests 
of people traveling along public roadways in his seminal Driving to the 
Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the 
Highway Technology of the Future. 94 The article suggests the image of a 
panopticon (literally an all-seeing device) which Jeremy Bentham advocated 
as a powerful prison design in 1791. Bentham's concept of a panopticon 
prison made each prisoner's every movement continuously visible to guards 
who could watch all of the prisoners all of the time. Bentham noted that in 
practice it would not be necessary to have guards actually watch each prisoner 
at every moment. Simply the potential for complete and continuous vi~ibility 
would cause each prisoner to watch himself all the time. Such a system 
would, Bentham argued, give the state even more power over prisoners than 
keeping the prisoners bound in chains. In short, the panopticon was designed 
to give authorities intense control over prisoners.9S Concerns about abject 
conformity and warped human personalities that could result from such a 
dystopian everyone-is-visible-all-the-time regime was, of course, part of the 
searing image of an all-seeing Big Brother in George Orwell's novel, 1984.96 
94. Jeffrey H. Reiman. Driving to the Panopticon: A philosophical Exploration of the Risks to 
Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future. II SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L 
1. 27 (1995). 
95.. Michel Foucault emphasized this point in his discussions of what Foucault called "panopticism." 
MICHEL foUCAULT. DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH 195-228 (Alan Sheridan trans .• Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) 
(1978). 
96. ORWELL, supra note 7. 
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The world of the panopticon, or of 1984, offers a powerful perspective on 
some of the privacy interests at stake on the open road. 
Defining privacy as "the condition in which others are depri,ved of access 
to you,,,97 Reiman describes some of the moral risks posed by a complex of 
information-gathering and surveillance focused on highway travelers. One 
such risk is the vulnerability of people, whose movements are monitored, to 
having their behavior controlled by others through pressures, legal and 
otherwise, for social conformity, rather than through independent thought and 
action. Moreover, Reiman warns against the destructive effect on human 
personality of not having .control over who observes and keeps track of an 
observed individual.98 Indeed,' comprehensive surveillance tends to be socially 
destructive because it signals disrespect for the individual person by treating 
Qer as an object, rather than .as a self-determining individual. In the end, 
pervasive surveillance can distort the very nature of a human personality. It 
saps a person of dignity and self-respect by distorting the way the individual 
thinks of himself and for himself. The individual person becomes an object 
to be acted upon, rather than a morally responsible actor. 
. Privacy interests are grounded in such concerns about individual worth 
and self-determination,99 the right of an individual to decide for herself where 
she will go and what she will do. Although writers about privacy have long 
argued about particular language or categories describing privacy, 100 modem 
legal analysis conventionally divides privacy interests into two categories: 
autonomy privacy (or decisional privacy) interests and information privacy (or 
data privacy) interests. 101 Privacy interests in the context of public roads and' 
highways are notable in combining both autonomy privacy interests and infor-
mation privacy interests, as well as a third factor that affects both categories 
97. Reiman, supra note 94, at 30. 
98. Jeffrey Rosen has made a similar point in his books. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED SOCIETY 
(2003); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE (2000). 
99. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REv. 193, 198 . 
(1890). Brandeis, who was the primary author of the article referred to privacy as the individual's right to 
an "inviolate personality." Id. at 205. See Dorothy Glancy, The Invention of the Rightto Privacy, 21 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1 (1979). 
100. For leading legal theoreticians who propose different views of privacy see ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
THE AsSAULT ON PRN ACY (1971); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRN ACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Edward J. Bloustein, 
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); 
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 
393 (1978); William L Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L REv. 383 (1960). 
101. This is the approach of the California courts in describing the privacy interests protected under 
the California Constitution's guarantee of an "inalienable right to privacy," (CAL. CONST. art. L § 1 (1879». 
Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633,654 (Cal. 1994). The court described information 
privacy as ''interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information." 
Id. Autonomy privacy refers to "interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal 
activities without observation, intrusion or interference." Id. 
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of privacy interests. This third factor is the panopticon effect of com-
prehensive surveillance suggested by Professor Reiman, as discussed above. 
Autonomy Privacy Interests 
Autonomy privacy interests are characterized by a person's ability to 
make decisions and to act "without observation, intrusion or interference." 102 
Indeed, surveillance of people on the open road implicates several types of 
autonomy interests, such as the right to go where one wants to go without 
being watched, the right to consent, or not, to others' use of one's travel 
patterns, and the right not to be intruded on by oppressive governmental or 
private-sector entities-Big Brother, Big Sister and the gang oflittle brothers 
noted at the beginning of this article. Although, autonomy privacy is often 
associated with intimate choices such as those regarding sex and procreation, 
other much less intimate choices and activities also deserve protection against 
outside interference. 
Protection of autonomy has historically embraced freedom of movement. 
For example, Justice William O. Douglas, in describing various zones of 
privacy, envisioned an outermost privacy zone where the individual has "free-
dom to walk, stroll, or loaf." 103 Surveillance systems, such as those described 
above, whether they are law enforcement or ITS systems, affect the autonomy 
of travelers by overriding individual control over who or what watches and 
keeps track of an individual's movements from place to place. Travelers 
forced to look over their shoulders for surveillance systems are affected by not 
knowing whether or when their actions are being captured by others. Parti-
cularly in choices about whether or not to do something unconventional or to 
go to a potentially controversial place, this uncertainty can be stifling. When 
such surveillance is under the control of the government, privacy concerns 
become also political concerns about centralizing too much power in a 
overbearing state. 
Roadway surveillance affects autonomy privacy interests in several ways. 
First, unseen collection of information about where people travel is often 
connected up with these travelers' personal data, consumption patterns or 
other information about them, without the persons involved being aware of, 
much less consenting to the collection of the information. When such infor-
mation is combined and consolidated with other personal information into a 
profile of an individual's supposed personal characteristics, the individual 
deserves to be consulted. Even aside from information privacy issues dis-
cussed below, such practices treat people as objects, rather than as autonom-
102. [d. 
103. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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ous persons. Such practices also make people fear potential consequences 
such as increased insurance rates, marital discord, or the appearance of hypo-
crisy. Even when marketing companies do not identify particular drivers, 
individuals whose movements are monitored without their consent often feel 
manipulated by being turned into fodder for an unseen data base in which the 
individuals did not agree to participate. 
Moreover, people feel violated when surveillance results in feedback in 
the form of marketing pitches based on "personal" profiles used to label them 
as belonging in one consumer category or another. For example, people who 
regularly travel between particular geographic areas may be "branded" as 
having particular characteristics, such as income level or ethnicity. Although 
demographic information in such profiles may be aggregated, the potential for 
disaggregation, to the point of identifying a particular person, causes further 
privacy concerns. After all, when aggregate data is "sliced and diced" (as the 
marketing industry aptly describes techniques of data analysis), it often 
becomes possible to narrow the reference down to a particular individual. For 
example, sorting by zip code, then year and type of vehicle, and perhaps age 
can sharpen the demographic focus to just one or two people. 
In addition, advertising use of demographic information often seeks to 
psychologically manipulate consumers targeted according to the neighborhood 
in which they live or the locations to which they travel. Most people find 
receiving unsolicited information from an anonymous source that knows 
where they live, where they have driven recently and where they regularly 
travel to be very unsettling and intrusive. In the future, when drivers receive 
such targeted information from their on-board DSRC unit as they drive from 
one place to another, the sense of intrusion, not to mention the noise level, is 
likely to be magnified. In the near future, telematics systems will automati-
cally beam billboard-type advertising into vehicles by sending location-based 
advertising messages directly targeted to identified drivers. When that 
happens complaints about intrusion are likely to rise. Drivers intruded upon 
by such targeted marketing messages may find this beamed advertising much 
more intrusive than billboards, which drivers can simply refuse to look at. 
Finally, an individual may never know that law enforcement agencies, 
perhaps for intelligence or investigative purposes, not only have collected 
surveillance information but also have gained access to privately collected 
consumer data. Even law-abiding drivers may feel the pressure of such 
potential unseen government scrutiny. As law enforcement concerns about 
terrorist threats involving transportation systems has increased, people are 
aware of an increased emphasis on watching out for threats and dangerous 
people on the nation's often-congested highways. Most people on highways 
probably share such concerns about homeland security. But they also may 
find that their autonomy is constrained by the potential for being watched and 
recorded everywhere they go on what still ironically called "the open road." 
HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 324 2004
324 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
Information Privacy Interests 
Information privacy interests are concerned with "precluding the disse-
mination or rriisuse of sensitive and confidenti~· information." 104 Information 
privacy interests are affected when surveillance systems collect, categorize, . 
use and store information about a person's whereabouts, both past and present. 
When that is done without the person's consent, the autonomy privacy 
interests discussed above are also affected. Because a person's location at a 
particular moment may also be very sensitive information, such roadway 
surveillance often affects information privacy interests· as well. Personal 
location information, for example, may be just what an individual does not 
want others, such as a stalker, to know. Although a person's pattern of travel 
is rarely completely secret or confidential, a person expects that her move-
ments from place to place will be evanescent, leaving no permanent trace. . 
Alexander Sholzenitzen capfured the sense of being trapped by records 
in his famous image of personal information as the strands of a spider web: 
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the 
record, each containing a number of questions. . .. There are thus 
hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of 
threads in all. If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the 
whole sky would look like a spider's web, and if they materialized as 
rubber bands, buses, trams and even people would all lose the ability 
to move, ~d the wind would be unable to carry tom-up newspapers 
or autumn leaves along the streets of the city. They are not visible, 
they are not material, but every man is constantly aware of their 
existence. . ~. Each man, permanently aware of his· own invisible 
threads~ naturally develops a respect for the people who manipulate 
the threads. 105 
Information about a person's movements in physical space belongs, in a 
fundamental sense, to the person without whom such information could not 
exist, whose travel decisions created the pattern of information and whose 
very personality is embodied in the pattern. An anonymous surveillance 
system or transportation database that captures those patterns, lacks the 
originating individual's claim to ownership. 
Surveillance systems that collect and digitize information about a 
person's present and past locations and travel patterns are making use of 
information that properly belongs to the individual traveler: Use by others of 
104. Hill. 865 P.2d at 654. 
105. ALExANDER I. SOlZHENITSYN. CANCER WARD (1968); 
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personal information about an individual without the individual's consent 
interferes with the individual's information privacy interests. These infor-
mation privacy interests include both consenting or refusing to consent to 
collection of information about one's location and travel, as well as preventing 
dissemination or misuse of personal details about one's life and travels. 
Dossiers, itineraries, profiles of the places where a person has been,· all 
impinge on important information privacy interests of an individual. When 
the individual who is the subject of the information has no way of knowing 
about or affecting the collection of the information by unseen surveillance 
systems, the individual is powerless to affect, much less constrmn, use of the 
individual's personal information by invisible users. 
Information collected through roadway surveillance can be used to annoy 
the individual through targeted marketing and advertizing. Such information 
can also be used to harass the individual through stopping and questioning her. 
Such information may even be used by stalkers to frighten or even to kill the 
individual. Such information can be used by government agencies, including 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, to find suspicious individuals for 
detention or control. Roadway surveillance information can also be used to 
profile individuals, to predict their future actions, and to psychologically 
manipulate their choices about where to travel. 
The ITS technologies discussed above have a particularly high potential 
for affecting information privacy. License plate recognition systems can note 
the location of a particular vehicle and keep track of other locations where that 
vehicle has appeared over time. Prediction of a person's future movements 
can be based on profiles compiled from past archived itineraries. Remote 
traffic cameras that capture digital images of individuals and vehicles can 
locate a person, whether she is a driver or a passenger or even a pedestrian or 
passerby. These digital images can be stored indefinitely for future reference. 
Beepers and toll tag transponders can also be used to follow the movements 
of a person and pinpoint that person's current location. GPS devices secreted 
on a vehicle can keep detailed logs of the times and places of all movements 
for later downloading and analysis. Cellular telephone technology's required 
automatic location information provides real-time information about the 
location of a wireless telecommunication device and its user's movements 
from place to place. Archives of individual itineraries derived from all of 
these technologies can be used both to associate an individual with locations 
the individual frequented in the past, as well as to predict future destinations. 
Whenever information about an identified or identifiable person is 
collected, information privacy interests are affected. In some ways, ITS 
applications can be more mindful of these informational privacy interests than 
other types of surveillance because ITS has the advantage of being an 
application of intelligent systems. The intelligence of these systems is useful 
not only in solving transportation problems, but also in building privacy pro-
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tections into the very architecture of the technologies. For example, an intelli-
gent system can be designed so that it does not collect information about 
individuals at all. Alternatively, an intelligent system can be designed to mini-
mize the personal information that is collected and how long the information 
is kept, as well as to restrict the availability of the information to others. 
When intelligent systems collect individually identifiable information, that 
information can be automatically encrypted using strong encryption and 
automatically destroyed when a transitory purpose, such as ascertaining real-
time traffic speed, is past. Indeed, responsible ITS agencies have required that 
privacy protection be built into ITS systems which may affect information 
privacy interests. 106 
Other not-so-intelligent attempts to do something about privacy will not 
work very well. For example, developers of ITS systems designed to collect 
and distribute large amounts of personally identifiable information may just 
add on privacy protection at the last stage of the design, rather than building 
privacy into way the ITS system is organized. When such information privacy 
add-ons are pasted onto a surveillance system that maximizes collection and 
exposure of personal information, it is quite easy for hackers or intelligence 
agencies to circumvent such measures by simply going upstream in the data 
flow-after the data is collected but before the privacy protections apply. For 
example, a traffic surveillance system that uses license plate recognition to 
time vehicles at successive locations to determine traffic speed may eventually 
encrypt the digitized license plate information. However, someone else, say 
a private investigator or an intelligence agency, can either routinely or in 
particular cases reach in and capture the data before it is encrypted. Un-
authorized persons, whether a private investigator working a domestic rela-
tions case or a stalker bent on mayhem, may also capture information about 
particular vehicles associated with targeted people, through such an "up-
stream" access. The result is unintelligent and ineffective privacy protection. 
Fortunately, responsible members of the ITS industry, with assistance 
from the Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITS-America) the 
trade association of the ITS industry, have adopted privacy principles that 
recognize the need to protect information privacy as part of ITS -intelligent 
systems. These principles urge development of ITS applications that are 
designed to protect information privacy froni the ground up. ITS America's 
"Intelligent Transportation Systems Fair Information and Privacy Principles" 
were "prepared in recognition of the importance of upholding individual 
106. For example, the TravInfo traveler infonnation system in the San Francisco Bay area has 
embraced significant privacy protections. See 511 Traffic website, at http://traffic.511.orglprivacy.asp(last 
visited Aug. 10,2004). See also Adam Clymer, Tracking Bay Area Traffic Creates Concern/or Privacy, 
N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at All. 
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privacy in implementing Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). . .. Initia-
tors of ITS projects are urged to publish the fair information and privacy prin-
ciples that they intend to follow. Parties to ITS are urged to include enforce-
able provisions for safeguarding privacy in their contracts and agreements." 107 
These principles are not perfect protections for information privacy. But they 
do recognize the need to respect the information privacy interests of 
individuals whose lives may be caught up in ITS systems. 
The Panopticon Effect 
The collection of personal information by impersonal government and 
private-sector roadway surveillance agencies also has political, as well as 
psychological and practical dimensions. Authoritarian systems can misuse 
information about individuals to round up suspects or to treat people as 
undesirables based on where they are or have been. Systems that comprehen-
sively keep track of the whereabouts of each person in all places and at all 
107. See Fair Information and Privacy Principles, Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITS) 
website, at http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:IEpp7uNV2GoJ :www.itsa.orglsubject.nsfl836e8941046 
dcc0e852565860062dbOdlc34171 cc9664b456852569430060955a1%24FILElBoard%2520Approved% 
2520Privacy%2520Principles.doc+%22prepared+in+recognition+of+the+importance+of+upholding+in 
dividual%22&hl=en (last visited Aug. 10,2004). The ITS-America information privacy principles include 
the following: 
[d. 
I. INDIVIDUAL CENTERED. Intelligent Transportation Systems must recognize and 
respect the individual's interests in privacy and information use. 
2. VISmLE. Intelligent Transportation Information Systems will be built in a manner 
"visible" to individuals. 
3. COMPLY. Intelligent Transportation Systems will comply with applicable state and 
federal laws governing privacy and information use. 
4. SECURE. Intelligent Transportation Systems will be secure. 
5. LAW ENFORCEMENT. Intelligent Transportation Systems have an appropriate role in 
enhancing travelers' safety and security interests, but absent consent, statutory authority, 
appropriate legal process, or emergency circumstances as defined by law, information 
identifying individuals will not be disclosed to law enforcement. 
6. RELEVANT. Intelligent Transportation Systems will only collect personal information 
that is relevant for ITS purposes. 
7. ANONYMITY. Where practicable, individuals should have the ability to utilize 
Intelligent Transportation Systems on an anonymous basis. 
8. COMMERCIAL OR OTHER SECONDARY USE. Intelligent Transportation Systems 
information stripped of personal identifiers may be used for non-ITS applications. 
9. FOlA. Federal and State Freedom of Information Act (FOlA) obligations require 
disclosure of information from government maintained databases. Database arrangements 
should balance the individual's interest in privacy and the public's right to know. 
10. OVERSIGHT. Jurisdictions and companies deploying and operating Intelligent 
Transportation Systems should have an oversight mechanism to ensure that such deployment 
and operation complies with their Fair Information and Privacy Principles. 
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times produce profiles or predictive patterns of where a tracked person is 
likely to be found and where that person is likely to go. The destructive 
psychological effect of maintaining centralized information about each 
individual compromises these individuals' self-determination and autonomy. 
As noted above, a person who knows that she is, or can be, constantly 
watched is not free. In addition, comprehensive centralized tracking systems 
can also use that information to affect the individual's future choices about 
where it is "safe" or "not safe" to go. Human nature tends to resist being 
categorized, manipulated psychologically, intimidated and mechanistically 
predicted by society. But with comprehensive surveillance in place, every 
time a person goes from one place to another on public roads, the surveillance 
would both take its toll on the individual and also concentrate great power in 
those in control of the surveillance. This combination of factors impinging on 
individual freedom is the panoptic on effect. 
The panoptic on effect is a predictable result of wide-scale comprehensive 
surveillance. Indeed, Michel Foucault described "panopticism" as a key 
mechanism of centralized social control. \08 The combination of technologies 
described in the previous part of this article have the capacity to create a world 
in which the panopticon is a reality for those who travel on public roadways. 
The pervasiveness of modem roadway surveillance technologies makes it 
possible for a central authority to find, to follow and to keep track of nearly 
everyone. Almost any individual's movements from place to place can be 
tracked without the individual knowing whether or not she is being tracked, 
or has been tracked. The realization that such centralized tracking is possible 
impresses a profound sense of powerlessness upon an individual and affects 
her choices about where, and where not, to go. That is the panopticon effect. 
For those concerned about individual privacy, centralized systematic scrutiny 
that is ubiquitous as well as covert simply represents too much societal control 
over the individual. It makes ordinary drivers feel as if they were prisoners in 
Jeremy Bentham's prison, rather than presumptively law-abiding people on 
the open road. With roadway surveillance technologies multiplying into so 
many avenues of societal control, there appear to be few escape routes for 
individual freedom and imagination. The panopticon will have become a 
reality when individual choices about where to go and what to do are under 
the control of the system. 
A century and a half ago, in writing about the Constitutional History of 
England, Sir Thomas May noted the problematic consequences of the 
panopticon effect: 
108. See FOUCAULT, supra note 95, at 195-228. 
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Next in importance to personal freedom is immunity from suspicions 
and jealous observation. Men may be without restraints upon their 
liberty; they may pass to and fro at pleasure; but if their steps are 
tracked by spies and informers, their words noted down for crimina-
tion, their associates watched as conspirators,-who shall say that 
they are free? Nothing is more revolting ... than the espionage which 
forms part of the administrative system of continental despotisms. It 
haunts men like an evil genius, chills their gayety, restrains their wit, 
casts a shadow over their friendships, and blights their domestic 
hearth. The freedom of a country may be measured by its immunity 
from this baleful agency. 109 
Modem courts in the United States sometimes sound similar alarms. 
329 
In an Oregon decision involving a beeper attached without a warrant to 
a burglary suspect's automobile, the Oregon Supreme Court expounded his 
state's constitutional right to freedom from technologically advanced scrutiny: 
Since 1859 . . . [when the Oregon Constitutional provision was 
adopted], the government's ability to scrutinize the affairs of "the 
people" has been enhanced by technological and organizational 
developments that could not have been foreseen then. Tiny radio 
transmitters for surreptitiously locating objects to which the transmit-
ters are attached are among these developments .... Any device that 
enables the police quickly to locate a person or object anywhere 
within a 40-mile radius, day or night, over a period of several days, is 
a significant limitation on freedom from scrutiny .... The limitation 
is made more substantial by the fact that the radio transmitter is much 
more difficult to detect than would-be observers who must rely upon 
the sense of sight. Without an ongoing, meticulous examination of 
one's possessions, one can never be sure that one's location is not 
being monitored by means of a radio transmitter. Thus, individuals 
must more readily assume that they are the objects of government 
scrutiny .... [F]reedom may be impaired as much, if not more so, by 
the threat of scrutiny as by the fact of scrutiny .... [If no warrant is 
necessary for the use of an electronic transmitter], no movement, no 
location and no conversation in a "public place" would in any 
measure be secure from the prying of the government. There would 
in addition be no ready means for individuals to ascertain when they 
109. THOMAS E. MAY, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND SINCE THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE 
THE THIRD 1760-1860 275 (Boston: Crosby & Nichols, 1862-1864), available at http://www.don-aitken. 
freeuk.comlemay3v039.html (last visited Aug. 10,2(04). 
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were being scrutinized and when they were not. That is nothing short 
of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom. I 10 
When the Oregon court warned about infringing the right to be free from 
scrutiny, it was calling for opposition to the panopticon effect. 
In the State of Washington, the supreme court raised similar concerns 
about the panopticon effect in a case involving use of GPS devices. The 
Supreme Court of Washington upheld the use of the GPS devices because the 
devices' installation and use were authorized by judicial warrants. In 
discussing the importance of requiring warrants in cases involving such 
surveillance technologies, the court warned: 
[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device 
is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal 
about an individual's life. For example, the device can provide a 
detailed record of travel to doctors' offices, banks, gambling casinos, 
tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings, bars, 
grocery stores, exercise gyms, places where children are dropped off 
for school, play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant and the fast 
food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball game, the 
"wrong" side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor rally. In 
this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places 
that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and 
foibles .. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels, and thus 
can provide a detailed picture of one's life .... 
. . . [U]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive 
method of surveillance, making it possible to acquire an enormous 
amount of personal information about the citizen under circumstances 
where the individual is unaware that every single vehicle trip taken 
and the duration of every single stop may be recorded by the govern-
ment. 
We conclude that the citizens of this State have a right to be free 
from the type of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS 
device is attached to a citizen's vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy 
expectations due to advances in technology. I I I 
The Washington Supreme Court appears to share the Oregon court's call for 
resistance to the panopticon effect. 
110. State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048-1049 (Or. 1988) 
111. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223-24 (Wash. 2003). 
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The panopticon effect has been a longstanding concern of those inte-
rested in promoting technological progress and security. Advocates of tech-
nology, as well as privacy advocates, share concerns about the impact of such 
technologies on human personality and privacy. Technology advocates are 
worried that the panopticon effect will erode trust in and generate restrictions 
on roadway surveillance technologies. On the other hand, privacy advocates 
are concerned about controlling surveillance technologies so that they do not 
have undesirable personal or political consequences. 
More than thirty years ago in United States v. White, 112 a plurality of the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the use of wired informers as not a 
search or seizure. But two of the dissenting Justices warned about the 
consequences of not paying attention to the panopticon effect. Justice Harlan, 
dissenting, insisted on the need for "assessing the nature of a particular 
practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security 
balanced against the utility of the .. , technique of law enforcement." I 13 In 
his dissenting opinion in White, Justice Harlan felt that the law enforcement 
technology involved in that case had too great an impact on the individual's 
sense of security. In his dissenting opinion in White, Justice Douglas more 
dramatically warned about the tyranny of technology over humanity. Justice 
Douglas admonished, "Today no one perhaps notices because only a small, 
obscure criminal is the victim. But every person is the victim, for the 
technology we exalt today is everyman's master.,,114 
It is important to carefully consider privacy interests before deploying 
roadway surveillance technologies that can compromise individual privacy 
and result in a panopticon effect. Indeed, there is a history of adverse public 
response to government programs designed to collect information about 
individuals. When these surveillance systems appear to be building blocks 
toward the construction of a surveillance panopticon, public and political 
outrage is likely. 115 It is important for those who believe that technology is not 
112. 401 u.s. 745 (1971). 
113. [d. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
114. [d. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
115. For example, negative public response doomed the Department of Defense's infamous "Total 
Information Awareness"office, even as it was later reconstituted as the "Terrorism Information Awareness" 
program. See discussion supra notes 9-11. 
Other similar data collection projects are the Justice Department's Matrix (Multistate 
Antiterrorism Information Exchange) program and the Transponation Security Agency's CAPPS II. With 
regard to Matrix, see Black, supra note 10. Apparently only Florida, Michigan, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
and Ohio continue to cooperate with the program. Schwanz, supra note 10. With regard to CAPPS II, an 
updated version of the existing airpon screening program, Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 
System, see Behar, supra note II. Concerns about the privacy of screening information has caused 
repeated delays in the launch of CAPPS II. See, e.g., Venon, supra note 11; Wald, supra note 11. 
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incompatible with privacy to assure that the many new forms of roadway 
surveillance do not loom over the nation's highways like a panopticon. 
N. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVACY ON THE OPEN ROAD 
Courts and legislatures across the United States are keenly aware of the 
privacy interests discussed in the previous part of this article. BalanCing what 
is properly protected as private against what needs to be public in a roadway 
setting is often difficult. As a result, decision makers usually recognize that 
roadway privacy protections are virtually never absolute, but rather depend on 
particular circumstances. As courts and legislatures balance both individual 
and societal concerns in determining whether a particular type of roadway 
surveillance requires restriction for privacy reasons, they often focus on larger 
societal implications, such as the panopticon effect. When roadway S\lr-
veillance appears to result in overwhelming societal control over individuals, 
privacy interests are most likely to prevail in both public policy and legal 
determinations. 
In many cases, the balance between what is appropriately private and 
what is necessarily public on the road is expressed in terms of reasonable 
expectations of privacy, a concept that will be examined first. Then Fourth 
Amendment restrictions on stopping vehicles on roadways will be contrasted 
with Fourth Amendment tolerance of tracking people on roads and highways. 
After considering some of the cases imposing tort liability for interfering with 
the privacy of people on roadways, this discussion of legal protections for 
privacy on the.open road will conclude with a look at some specific statutes 
enacted to protect roadway privacy against surveillance technologies. 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy on the Open Road 
Legal protections for privacy, both on the open road and elsewhere, are 
often described in terms of reasonable expectations of privacy. "Reasonable 
expectations of privacy" usually expresses a conclusion that an individual's 
privacy interests outweigh the interests of society. Although most commonly 
used in deciding whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonable 
expectations of privacy concept also appears more broadly in other types of 
privacy laws, including tort, state constitutional protections and even privacy 
legislation. Whether reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is useful in 
considering privacy protections on roads and highways is a deeper question 
about which there is substantial disagreement. 
Analysis of privacy cases in terms of "reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy" is based on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 
a case involving privacy claims that surreptitiously recorded conversations 
from a public phone booth should be suppressed. The majority opinion by 
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Justice Stewart rejected earlier interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that 
limited its protections to instances where government agents had trespassed 
on property interests of the person claiming Fourth Amendment protection. 
In ruling that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places," 116 Justice 
Stewart, writing for the majority, rejected the older property-based limitations 
that had routinely withheld Fourth Amendment protections from people in 
public places, such as roads and highways. 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz added that decisions whether 
or not the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements 
should apply at all require consideration of two separate issues: "My 
~nderstanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there 
is a twofold requirement, ftrst that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. "'117 Although Justice 
Harlan continued to believe that the place where a person is located is relevant 
in such an analysis, he insisted that even in public places there are areas where 
"occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reason-
able."118 Over the years Justice Harlan's two-fold reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis morphed from an inquiry whether an expectation of privacy 
was subjectively and objectively "reasonable"119 into similar inquiries into 
whether such the privacy expectation was "j ustiftable" I 20 or "legitimate" I 21 or 
. sometimes all three. 122 
Reasonable expectations of privacy analysis does not work very well in 
considering privacy interests in public roadway contexts. A person on a road 
seems, almost by deftnition·, to lack both the subjective and objective elements 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy. And yet, there are numerous instances 
where the privacy of people on public roads has been protected by law. 
Protecting privacy on public roadways is a feature of search and seizure 
decisions as well as of applications of state constitutional privacy guarantees. 
Damage actions for intrusion on the privacy of people on roads and highways 
116. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967). Although Katz was in a public place, the Court 
insisted that "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected." /d. 
117. [d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
118. [d. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
119. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
120. "Justifiable" was the chosen privacy-expectation modifier in the plurality opinion in United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), which also used "reasonable" and "legitimate" as adjectives. See also 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
121. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (discussing the legitimacy of privacy 
expectations). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,540 (2001). 
122. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 315 (1987). 
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are also possible. Moreover, such privacy claims are reflected in legislation 
designed to rein in surveillance technologies used on public roadways. It is 
possible to construe these legal privacy protections for privacy on the open 
road as just reflections of subjectively and objectively reasonable expectations 
of privacy. But such a reasonable expectations of privacy analysis does not 
reach the deeper questions of whether and when privacy ought to be protected 
in this setting. 
When the privacy of people on public roads is legally protected, two 
types of factors are usually important: context factors and consequence 
factors. First, the context in which the issue of protecting privacy is raised is 
important. In court cases, the procedural context is also significant. For 
example, whether privacy protection is at issue with regard to suppression of 
a particular item of evidence in a criminal prosecution is a different procedural 
context from deciding whether stopping people on highways should be a 
routine law enforcement practice. Protecting privacy is more likely in the 
latter type of context. For both courts and legislatures, the factual context, 
such as how a particular type of surveillance works, and whether surveillance 
is covert or visible, are also important factors. 
Second, the consequences of protecting or not protecting individual 
privacy in terms of government or private-sector power over an individual are 
likely to partly determine when the privacy of people on roads and highways 
should be protected. Ultimately, the overriding issue in these roadway situa-
tions focuses on how much societal power over individuals is tolerable. A 
certain degree of societal control is to be expected, because the open road is 
a setting where individuals and society interact. But too much societal control 
stifles individual freedom. Finding an appropriate balance is crucial. 
Somehow mechanically applying reasonable expectations of privacy analysis 
seems to obscure this vital point. 
Critics of reasonable expectations of privacy analysis come from many 
different directions. Not all reasonable expectations of privacy critics favor 
protecting privacy of people on open roads. Perhaps the most acerbic of such 
critics is Justice Scalia, who complains that the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test lacks any "plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment," and is also "self-indulgent." 123 He scoffs that, "[U]nsurprisingly, those 
'actual (subjective) expectations of privacy' 'that society is prepared to 
recognize as 'reasonable,' ... bear an uncanny resemblance to those expecta-
tions of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.,,124 
Even Justice Harlan, who originated reasonable expectations of privacy 
analysis, later became concerned about its meaningfulness. Four years after 
123. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, I., concurring). 
124. [d. (Scalia, I., concurring) (quoting in part Katz, 389 u.S. at 361). 
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concurring in Katz, Justice Harlan dissented in White, a case in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that the use of a surreptitiously wired 
informer did not infringe any reasonable expectation of privacy: 
While ["reasonable expectation of privacy"] [ ] formulations 
represent an advance over the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the 
common law, they too have their limitations and can, ultimately, lead 
to the substitution of words for analysis. The analysis must, in my 
view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal 
attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we 
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules 
the customs and values of the past and present. 
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as 
mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the 
expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling 
them upon society. The critical question, therefore, is whether under 
our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should 
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer 
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement. 125 
Undesirable consequences in terms of too much government control over 
individuals seemed to Justice Harlan to be more important than whether or not 
people expect that those with whom they talk may be wired informers. For 
Justice Harlan the real issue was whether or not wired informers were to 
become an acceptable feature of life in the United States. Justice Harlan 
thought they should not. That is why he dissented in White. 
More recently, Justice O'Connor in her majority opinion for the Court in 
Indianapolis v. Edmond,126 a case involving drug-interdiction roadblocks, 
discussed below, also reflected a similar uneasiness with reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy analysis. In fact she avoided even mentioning reasonable 
expectations of privacy in ruling: 
Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve 
the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do 
little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of 
American Life .... 
125. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, I., dissenting). 
126. 531 u.s. 32 (2000). 
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... We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized 
and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may 
reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. 127 
For Justice O'Connor, the issue was not whether Edmond's expectation of 
privacy on the highway outside Indianapolis was or was not reasonable. 
Rather,the issue for Justice O'Connor was the consequences, in particular the 
type of society fostered by tolerating such a practice of law enforcement 
routinely stopping law-abiding motorists on the chance that such motorists 
might be engaged in wrongdoing. She was particularly concerned about 
preventing the development of a society in which people on roads are forced 
to assume that they will be routinely stopped by law enforcement without any 
reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing. 
Other jurists have also criticized application of reasonable expectations 
of privacy analysis to on-the-road contexts from a different perspective. For 
example, in a series of decisions, the Oregon Supreme Court expressed doubts 
about ureasonable expectations of privacy" analysis in interpreting state 
constitutional protections against illegal searches. 128 In one of these decisions, 
involving warrantless use of a beeper, Justice Lent bluntly held: 
Because the ["reasonable expectations of privacy"] phrase continues 
to appear so often in arguments, we hereby expressly reject it for 
defining searches under [the Oregon Constitution's provisions regard-
ing searches and seizures]. . .. The phrase becomes a formula for 
expressing a conclusion rather than a starting point for analysis, 
masking the various substantive considerations that are the real bases 
on which Fourth Amendment Searches are defined .... [The privacy 
protected by the Oregon Constitution] is not the privacy that one 
reasonably expects but the privacy to which one has a right. 129 
Having banished expectations of privacy analysis, the court determined that 
the Oregon Constitutional right to privacy is violated when police install a 
tracking device on a vehicle without a warrant. 
These judicial opinions, as well as numerous statutes enacted to protect 
roadway privacy, seek to redirect attention to the societal consequences of 
protecting the privacy interests of people on the open road. Rather than 
quibbling about whether such expectations of privacy are subjectively and/or 
objectively reasonable, these opinions confront the basic issue whether a 
privacy interest deserves protection in the particular context of roads and 
127. Edmond. 531 U.S. at 43-44. 
128. State v. Tanner. 745 P.2d 757.762 n.7 (Or. 1987); State v. Louis. 672 P.2d 708. 710 (Or. 1983). 
129. State v. Campbell. 759 P.2d 1040. 1044 (Or. 1988) (emphasis in original). 
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highways. Their focus is on assessing the extent to which social control over 
individuals-whether from Big Brother, Big Sister, the gang of little brothers 
or some combination of them - is tolerable. 
Stopping a Vehicle on the Open Road is a Seizure 
Concerns about contexts and consequences of privacy claims, rather than 
whether expectations of privacy are reasonable, are clearly reflected in recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions holding that stopping a vehicle on a 
road or highway is a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 130 In 
two recent decisions,131 the United States Supreme Court has required that 
when law enforcement agents stop vehicles on roadways, these agents must 
have very good reasons for doing so. As a theoretical matter, there remains 
an underlying question whether such vehicle stops should occur only in 
exceptional cases (currently the view of the majority of the Court) or whether 
vehicle stops should be acceptable as a general rule (currently the view of a 
minority of the Justices). Insistence that government power over individuals 
needs to be limited and assiduously prevented from overwhelming individual 
freedom is part of the underlying explanation for the majority's insistence on 
protecting privacy on the open road from too many law enforcement stops, 
roadblocks, checkpoints, and the like. 
Law enforcement interest in roadways goes back many centuries. 132 
Modern efforts to capture criminal suspects on public roadways intensified 
early in the twentieth century, with the advent of the automobile and paved 
highways. When Prohibitionl33 became the law of the land, law enforcement 
agents began to look for bootleggers transporting illegal alcohol. During this 
time, the United States Supreme Court upheld a wide range of law enforce-
ment surveillance technologies such as wiretaps aimed at enforcing Prohibi-
tion.134 Stopping bootleggers on the highways to thwart distribution of illegal 
alcohol was among them. 135 
130. TIlinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004). 
131. [d.; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32. 
132. The so-called nightwalker statutes in England, beginning with the Statute of Winchester, 13 
Edw.1, Stat. 2, ch.4 (1285), were among the precursors of twentieth -century vagrancy laws, struck down 
on void-for-vagueness grounds in such cases as Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) and 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Local anti-cruising ordinances, such as that 
upheld in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990), are more modem manifestations of law 
enforcement concerns about roadways. See also, ROGER D. McGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN AND 
VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE FRONTIER (1984). 
133. U.S. CONST. amend. xvm (ratified 1919, repealed 1933). Roadway surveillance of course 
continued even after Prohibition was repealed in 1933 by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified 1933). 
134. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
135. Carroll v. United States. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
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In the first of the Prohibition-era automobile search and seizure cases, 
Carroll v. United States, 136 the same United States Supreme Court that would 
later uphold warrantless wiretapping of bootleggers, approved warrantless 
stopping and searching of cars suspected of containing contraband whiskey. 
Nevertheless the Court's opinion in Carroll took pains to recognize that 
people on public highways retain certain privacy rights. Chief Justice Taft's 
opinion for the Court characterized as "intolerable and unreasonable" 
authorizing law enforcement agents "to stop every automobile ... and thus 
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and 
indignity of such a search." 137 Chief Justice Taft expressed particular concern 
about the rights of those using the public highways "to free passage without 
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized 
to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying 
contraband or illegal merchandise.',I38 Although the Supreme Court held that 
the particular automobile searches and seizures involved in Carroll were 
lawful, the Court noted that there might well be constitutional objections to 
wholesale tracking of individuals on public roadways. In other words, 
following and stopping and searching a particular suspect was permissible. 
But broad scale surveillance designed to stop everyone on a public road would 
be "intolerable and unreasonable." 
That principle of not allowing government to stop anyone and everyone 
on the open road continues to playa significant role in evaluating the legality 
of stopping vehicles on roads and highways. This principle echoes classic 
notions of limited governmentl39 in insisting that courts and citizens ought to 
be skeptical about giving government too much power over individuals. It 
also reflects concerns about the panopticon effect noted above. Such wariness 
about the consequences of a too powerful government plays a particularly 
important role in two recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court in 
cases involving stopping vehicles on public roads. . 
The first of these decisions, Edmond, involved a narcotics checkpoint 
seeking to interdict illegal drugs. Police stopped all vehicles passing along a 
road into Indianapolis, examined each vehicle's exterior with a drug-sniffing 
dog, but did not search the interiors of the vehicles. The legal context of the 
Edmond decision was somewhat unusual for a search and seizure case, 
136. 267 U.s. 132 (1925). 
137. [d. at 153-54. 
138. [d. at 154. 
139. One of the most notable exponents of theories of constitutiona1limitations was Thomas Cooley, 
whose A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION was a mainstay of nineteenth century American 
constitutional theory after the Civil War. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATION WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
(Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1868). 
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because it involved neither the suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecu-
tion nor the so-called automobile exception to Fourth Amendment probable 
cause requirements for vehicle searches. Rather, Edmond was brought as a 
class action for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, by two 
ordinary motorists who had been stopped at the Indianapolis narcotics 
checkpoint. On behalf of all those stopped at such checkpoints, the plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of the program that, without any suspicion of 
wrongdoing, seized their vehicles and themselves. l40 Because the case was 
brought as a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief, only the general 
program of stopping vehicles, rather than any particular seizure or search of 
a suspect, was at issue before the Supreme Court. The consequences of pro-
tecting the privacy rights of motorists in general in these circumstances were 
the Court's main focus. "Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed 
primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment 
would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of 
American life," Justice O'Connor ruled. 141 As a routine program of suspi-
cionless seizures by law enforcement agents for general law enforcement 
purposes, the roadblocks were constitutionally intolerable. Justice 0' Connor's 
opinion for the Court ruled that, because such roadblocks constituted routine 
suspicionless seizures justified only by the municipality's general interest in 
crime control, such seizures violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The unusual context of this class action which was before the Court on 
stipulated facts, focused attention on the program of vehicle stops in general, 
not any particular stop. The six-justice majority struck down such routine nar-
cotics checkpoints along Indianapolis roads as an unconstitutional intrusion. 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion emphasizes that the Fourth Amend-
ment's "general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of 
individualized suspicion" rendered the roadblock program unconstitutional. 142 
"When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control 
purposes at checkpoints such as here ... stops can only be justified by some 
quantum of individualized suspicion.,,143 The opinion does not discuss any 
particular intrusion caused by the Indianapolis roadblocks at length other than 
to characterize the interferences as indiscriminate and not based on suspicions 
of wrongdoing. 
140. The plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied by the United States District 
Court. But the Seventh Circuit reversed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The case 
came before the United States Supreme Court on stipulated facts. 
141. Edmond. 531 U.S. at 42. 
142. [d. at 41. 
143. [d. at 47. 
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Much·of the majority opinion in Edmond is devoted to distinguishing 
other types of constitutionally permissible roadblock seizures, such as 
sobriety 144 and bOrder145 checkpoints, which the United States Supreme Court 
has upheld as constitutional. The Court characterized each of these roadblock 
or checkpoint programs as based on a specific reason or purpose that set each 
of these particular types of vehicle stops apart from the Fourth Amendment's 
general proscription that such intrusions are unconstitutional unless based on 
an individualized suspicion, According to Edmond, ''The constitutionality of 
such [other types of] checkpoint programs" require balancing "the competing 
interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program."I46 But as a general 
rule, "suspicionless intrusions pursuant to a general scheme" of law enforce-
ment are unreasonable even without balancing the competing interests of the 
government and individual. 147 What the Court protected in Edmond was the 
general principle that everyone, in particular people on public roads, have 
constitutionally protected rights to be let alone by the government. Under the 
Constitution, law enforcement is not normally permitted to routinely stop 
people on roads and highways without a reasonable suspicion. 148 
Edmond insists on the principle that people have the right to be left alone 
on public roads unless (a) the government has a reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity or (b) the government is justified in intruding on everyone because of 
a particularly vital government program. Without a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing, intrusions on the privacy of people in public places is presump-
tively unreasonable and unconstitutional unless one of a very limited set of 
exceptions applies, such as preventing people from driving under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol or enforcing immigration laws. The Edmond decision 
144. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
145. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The discretion of border agents to search 
vehicles for contraband was recently extended in United States v. Flores·Montano, 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004), 
which upheld removal and dismantling of a vehicle's fuel tank in searching for illegal drugs at an 
international border crossing. 
146. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47. 
147. [d. 
148. One interesting feature of the majority opinion is how little it has to say about privacy. Aside 
from a single reference, when mentioning the Court's earlier decision in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 
334 (2000) that had recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to carry-on luggage in the 
overhead compartment of a bus, the majority opinion does not use the word privacy at all. [d. Rather, the 
opinion discusses such a roadblock as an intrusion, without discussing privacy expectations that a person 
will not be stopped at a law enforcement checkpoint without a reasonable, focused suspicion that they have 
done something illegal. An example of a stop based on a reasonable suspicion is the stop in Atwater v. City 
o/Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), an action brought under§ 1983 against a law enforcement agency and 
officer, in which the ~ourt upheld a warrantless arrest of a woman for misdemeanor seat belt violations 
which the arresting police officer observed. [d. 
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articulates a general rule that law enforcement seizures of vehicles are pre-
sumptively unreasonable absent a targeted suspicion regarding individual 
wrongdoing or justification in terms of a critical need, such as controlling 
illegal immigration or excluding drivers under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs from highways. Without the peculiar contexts involved in these excep-
tions, stopping people on public roadways is an unconstitutional seizure. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Edmond, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, argues for an opposite general rule. According 
to the dissent, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy that one will not 
be stopped by the police along public roads. The dissent claims that properly 
regulated law enforcement roadblock stops of automobiles are presumptively 
reasonable and result in "only minimal intrusion on the privacy of their 
occupants.,,149 According to the dissent, people in public places should rea-
sonably expect intrusion from government. On public roadways, people can 
be stopped by law enforcement as a general rule. For this proposition, the 
dissent relies primarily on two precedents, Michigan Dep 't of State Police v. 
Sitz l50 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 151 both of which upheld certain 
roadblocks as constitutional. The dissent asserts that these decisions embody 
a general rule that roadblock stops are routinely acceptable. These are the 
very same decisions that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Edmond 
carefully distinguishes as exceptions to an opposite general rule that sus-
picionless roadblock stops are ordinarily not acceptable. 
Edmond displays a stark contrast between the views of the majority and 
those of the dissent regarding whether there is a presumption of privacy on the 
open road. The majority rules that there is a constitutionally significant 
intrusion when law enforcement routinely interferes with individuals on public 
roads. In contrast, the dissent insists that when an individual is on a public 
road, the Fourth Amendment requires only that the government have a 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory program for intrusions. At one point the 
dissent asserts, ''The only difference between this case and Sitz is the presence 
of the dog [that sniffed the exterior of the plaintiff's car in Edmondl."152 In 
a footnote, the majority opinion retorts that the dog-sniff of the exterior of the 
stopped vehicles is not why the roadblocks are unconstitutional. Rather, "the 
constitutional defect of the program is that its primary purpose is to advance 
the general interest in crime control.,,153 The fundamental disagreement 
149. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent asserts that roadblocks cause 
only minimal intrusions on privacy. See id. (Rehnquist, C.l., dissenting). 
150. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
151. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
152. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52 (Rehnquist, C.l., dissenting). 
153. [d. at 44 n.1. 
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between the majority and dissent is with regard to whether people in our 
society can require that law enforcement roadblocks will not, absent limited 
exceptional circumstances, intrude on them as they travel on public roads. It 
is not the dog that makes the difference in Edmond. What makes the 
difference is the majority's view that people have a right to be left alone as 
they travel from place to place. The general rule of the road is that the govern-
ment will not interfere with law-abiding travelers without a strong justifica-
tion. Justifications for interferences must be more specific than just a general 
interest in crime control. 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas focused on the issue 
dividing the majority and dissent-whether or not suspicionless law enforce-
ment stops should be considered a general rule of the road. Justice Thomas's 
opinion noted that he agreed with the dissent that under Sitz and Martinez-
Fuerte, properly regulated suspicionless roadblock seizures appear to be 
permitted as a general rule. But Justice Thomas's dissent importantly adds 
that he is not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided. 
He suggests that, absent these precedents, the appropriate interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment may well be the majority's general rule of privacy on 
public roads: "Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amend-
ment would have considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops 
of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.,,154 But because the issue of 
overruling Sitz and Martinez-Fuente had not been raised, much less briefed or 
argued, Justice Thomas did not think overruling these decisions was wise in 
Edmond. Justice Thomas's separate dissenting opinion signals that in Edmond 
there was a seventh Justice who believes that, as a general rule, people on 
public highways should not have to put up with suspicionless roadblocks for 
general law enforcement purposes. 
These issues returned to the Court in Illinois v. Lidster,155 in which the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an informational 
police checkpoint. The Court again reinforced the message of Edmond that 
as a general rule law-abiding motorists have a right not to be stopped for 
general law enforcement purposes in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing. In Lidster, local police had set up an "informational" checkpoint 
late on a Saturday night to obtain information from motorists about a hit-and-
run accident that had resulted in the death of a 70-year-old bicyclist the week 
before at about the same location and time of night. At the checkpoint, 
officers stopped each vehicle for 10 to 15 seconds, asked the occupants 
whether they had seen what had happened there the previous weekend, and 
handed each driver a flyer describing the accident and requesting information 
154. [d. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
ISS. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004). 
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about it. One of the stopped drivers was Lidster whose minivan swerved and 
nearly hit an officer. Smelling alcohol on Lidster's breath, the officer directed 
him to an area where another officer administered a sobriety test, after which 
Lidster was arrested for drunk driving. Convicted of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, Lidster challenged his conviction on the ground that an 
illegal checkpoint stop had been used to gather evidence against him in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The lllinois Supreme Court held that, under Edmond, the stop and the 
arrest that resulted from it were unconstitutional. But the United States 
Supreme Court upheld Lidster's conviction and distinguished Edmond on the 
grounds that Lidster was detained, not at a general law enforcement check-
point, but rather at a "brief, information-seeking highway" stop. In these 
circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the seizure was justified. In 
making this determination, the Court applied the standards of Brown v. 
Texas,156 a case that had considered law enforcement questioning of pedestri-
ans. 157 Three justices suggested that the case should have been remanded for 
the lllinois courts to apply the Brown standards. 
According to Justice Breyer's opinion for the majority, the importance 
and effectiveness of police seeking the help of the public in solving a serious 
crime and the minor delays and lack of intrusiveness caused by the informa-
tional checkpoint stop justified the Court's conclusion that the informational 
stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The unanimous Court in Lidster 
explained that "in judging reasonableness, we look to 'the gravity of the 
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty.",158 These standards are explicitly based on Brown159 
where the Court held unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment the pro-
secution of a pedestrian in an alley who refused to identify himself to police. 
156. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
157. [d. The Court held that "[i]n the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant [Brown] of 
misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy 
tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." [d. at 52. The Court described three factors to be used 
in determining that balance: "Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing 
of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." [d. at 50-51. 
158. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 51). 
159. [d. In Lidster, Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court refers to the AU, Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure section 110.1(1) (I975) ("[L]aw enforcement officer may ... request any person 
to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime"), and Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) ("[I]nterrogation of witnesses ... is undoubtedly an essential tool in 
effective law enforcement"); as well as U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement 14-15 (I999) (instructing law enforcement to gather information from witnesses near the 
scene). [d. 
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In a later decision interpreting Brown, the Court explained in Florida v: 
Royer, 160 that the Constitution ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary 
cooperation of members of the public in investigating a crime: "[L]aw en-
forcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approach-
ing an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he 
is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the 
person is willing to listen .... "161 In other words, even though stopping 
people is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment, such stops can be 
justified when police make simple police inquiries in criminal investigations. 
In Lidster, Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court reinforces Edmond's 
rulings that "an involuntary stop [of a vehicle] amounts to a 'seizure' in 
Fourth Amendment terms," and requires that such stops be evaluated with 
regard to their reasonableness based on the individual circumstances of each 
stop.162 Referring to other types of roadblocks allowed under Sitz (upholding 
a sobriety checkpoint) and Martinez-Fuerte (upholding a Border Patrol 
checkpoint), the Court found that the factors suggested in Brown also applied 
to informational police checkpoints. But the Court also made clear "[t]hat 
does not mean the stop is automatically, or even presumptively, constitutional. 
It simply means that we must judge its reasonableness, hence, its constitu-
tionality, on the basis of the individual circumstances.,,163 This portion of 
Justice Breyer's opinion for a unanimous Court in Lidster seems to settle the 
debate between the majority and dissent in Edmond over the general rule that 
people on the open road have the right not to be stopped by law enforcement, 
subject to a few specific exceptions. The general rule of the road remains a 
right not to be stopped absent a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.l64 
Justice Breyer's opinion also avoids Justice Thomas's concerns by not over-
ruling Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz. Rather, Justice Breyer places these decisions 
upholding certain roadblocks as lawful in a larger context, as Justice 
O'Connor had done in Edmond. In this larger context, roadblocks have to be 
justified under the standards established in Brown. 
Together, Lidster and Edmond suggest that stopping vehicles on road-
ways is presumptively unconstitutional, but nevertheless subject to a balancing 
analysis that takes into account the importance of public concerns served by 
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and 
160. 460 U.s. 491 (1983). 
161. [d. at 497. 
162. Lidster. 124 s. Ct. at 890. 
163. [d. 
164. In Atwater v. City of /Ago Vista. 532 U.s. 318 (2001). the Court had held that stopping a 
motorist who was violating seatbelt laws was proper and that she could be arrested and jailed even though 
her crime was only a misdemeanor. [d. 
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the severity of interference with individual liberty. 165 In unanimously ruling 
that vehicle stops are seizures, the Court endorsed a general rule that people 
on public roads have a right to be left alone, unless the government has very 
good reasons for interfering. Although Justice Breyer wryly noted that, "The 
Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle," the Court 
required "special law enforcement concerns" before vehicles can be lawfully 
stopped. l66 He also held that such concerns would only "sometimes justify 
highway stops without individualized suspicion.,,167 
Decisions by state courts regarding vehicle stops have also protected 
privacy interests of travelers along public roadways. Among the most impor-
tant is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. 
Whitmyer. 168 This suppression of evidence case involved the stop of a 
motorist who, police alleged, had made erratic lane changes, but had not 
violated traffic or other laws. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court insisted on 
"the privacy interest of the individual" in public circumstances. Quoting from 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse169 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: 
"An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose 
all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile 
and its use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel 
is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to 
and from one's home, workplace, and leisure activities. Many people 
spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the 
streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and 
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing them-
selves by pedestrian or other modes of travel." 170 
In the search and seizure context, whether with regard to suppression of 
evidence issues or suits to enjoin government intrusions, privacy along public 
roadways is generally protected against suspicionless stops. 
Being out in public on a highway exposes an individual to being noticed 
by others, including law enforcement. However, the consequences of allow-
ing law enforcement to stop any vehicle without either suspicion of wrong-
doing or special law enforcement concerns runs the risk of overwhelming the 
privacy rights of individuals with too much social control. Even jurists who 
165. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890. 
166. [d. at 889. 
167. [d. at 889 (emphasis added). 
168. 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995). 
169. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
170. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d at 1117 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662). 
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describe privacy on the open road as diminished or minimal, do not claim that 
it is nonexistent. Traditional concerns about curbing the potential for arbitrary 
exercise of government power apply. As Justice Brandeis noted in a different 
context, "The makers of our Constitution . .. conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men.,,171 Public roads are omnipresent 
aspects of people's lives. To require a complete waiver of Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests as an automatic consequence of using them would cede too 
much control over too important an area of life to government discretion. 
Other social consequences of on-road activities, such as public safety and 
solving crime are of course also important. So courts seek a balance that is 
neither all privacy nor all law enforcement in insisting that when law enforce-
ment stops a vehicle on a roadway, the stop must be based on an important 
justification. 
Open Roads as Open Fields? 
Federal Law Regarding Tracking People 
Tracking people and vehicles on the road raises very different 
. constitutional issues from the vehicle stops discussed above. Some might 
even assert that such tracking raises no constitutional issues at all. As a result, 
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard to roadway privacy 
appears to split right down the middle: On one side, recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions, discussed above, have made clear that Fourth 
Amendment protection regarding seizures precludes stopping people and 
vehicles a highway without sufficient justification. On the other side, the 
protection regarding searches in that same Fourth Amendment appears to not 
apply at all when those saIne people and vehicles are tracked, but not stopped, 
on those same highways. This anomaly is worth close examination. 
In general, Fourth Amendment limitations on law enforcement agents' 
tracking, as well as searching, vehicles on public roads are very lenient. This 
Federal Constitutional tolerance is often expressed in terms of exposure: 
Information exposed to general public perception appears to be fair game for 
law enforcement. Even technologically sophisticated surveillance is permitted 
if law enforcement could have collected similar information by physical 
surveillance and visual following. When automated technologies, such as 
GPS, collect much more detailed information than would have been available 
using visual surveillance, courts usually allow such tracking. They tend to 
find such tracking of it not to constitute a search at all for the purposes of the 
171. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (involving 
wiretapping without a warrant). 
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Fourth Amendment. They typically posit that if, in a perfect world with 
unlimited numbers of law enforcement agents with keen senses and limitless 
stamina available, these theoretical law enforcement agents could have 
collected the information by visual surveillance, then law enforcement use of 
automated surveillance technologies to collect such information is not 
constitutionally significant. Moreover, because courts often find that there is 
a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of those in automobiles, 172 the 
fact that such surveillance is of a vehicle also often helps to justify searching 
by tracking as legal under federal law .173 
The Fourth Amendment treatment of tracking vehicles on open roads is 
an extrapolation of the open fields doctrine articulated by Justice Holmes in 
United States v. Hester,174 a case involving a jug, a jar and a bottle of illegal 
moonshine whiskey that were found outside the defendant's father's house: 
"[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in 
their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. 
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common 
law.,,175 This territorial view of the applicability of Fourth Amendment 
warrant and probable cause requirements, known as the open fields doctrine, 
persists despite rejection of place as determinative of Fourth Amendment 
rights in Katz. 
The open fields doctrine gradually developed into an open-to-observation 
standard,176 although the early rulings did not define what would count as an 
open field, nor did they involve surveillance. Courts simply ruled that 
observing something out in the open is a non-event for the purposes of Fourth 
Amendment search limitations. For example, in Oliver v. United States, 177 a 
case involving outdoor marijuana cultivation behind locked gates and "no 
trespassing" signs, the United States Supreme Court discussed the open fields 
doctrine and interpreted it to mean that even when law enforcement agents 
ignored locked gates and no-trespassing signs that would likely have kept out 
most members of the public, "government's intrusion upon the open fields is 
172. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979)(collects a number of the early cases). See also 
Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Rakas v. illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
173. The treatment of automobiles as specially justifying searches because they are mobile dates back 
to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
174. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) 
175. Id. at 59 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 223, 225-26). 
176. Justice Douglas applied this doctrine in an environmental enforcement case. See Air Pollution 
Variance Bd. of Colorado v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974). 
177. 466 U.S. 170(1984). 
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not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.,,178 -
According to the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Riley,179 a 
case involving helicopter observations of marijuana cultivation, visual 
surveillance is permissible to the extent that what was gathered by law 
enforcement surveillance could also have been seen by the public: "What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection." 180 This decision, like many other open fields rulings, 
does not address roadways, nor does it require that anything had actually been 
seen by others. Rather it focuses on a hypothetical calculation about what 
might have been seen, had anyone tried to look. Courts have also ruled that 
what is theoretically not visible to public view because it is inside a home 
cannot be surveiled without probable cause and a warrant. In Kyllo v. United 
States,181 the United States Supreme Court held that warrantless use of 
infrared sensors to capture patterns of heat generated within a home by 
marijuana-growing violated the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, even when 
one is in a public place, the open-to-visual-observation rule does not apply to 
non-visual surveillance. In Bond v. United States, 182 tactile (rather than visual) 
investigation of a bag in the luggage rack of a public bus was determined to 
be a search under the Fourth Amendment, even though other people on the bus 
could also have discovered the contents of the bag by feeling it. The non-
visual search was held to be a search under the Fourth Amendment, even 
though what was searched was out in public on an intercity bus. The search 
was apparently not subject to the open fields doctrine, which would have 
made the search a non-event under the Fourth Amendment, because the 
information collected was non-visual in nature. 
The anomalous status of roadway surveillance is largely the result of a 
pair of United States Supreme Court decisions in the early 1980s involving the 
use of beepers: United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo. These two 
decisions established that the Fourth Amendment does not generally constrain 
law enforcement use of electronic tracking devices on the open road. 
Although the devices at issue in these cases were primitive beepers, the rules 
set forth in these cases have been applied to all sorts of far more sophisticated 
tracking devices, such as GPS devices, cell phones and telematics. 
178. [d. at 177 (relying on Hester, 265 U.S. at 57). 
179. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
180. [d. at 449 (citingCallfomia v. Ciraol0,476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katzv. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967». 
181. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
182. 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
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In 1983, the United States Supreme Court evaluated law enforcement use 
of beepers in Knotts, in which a beeper was used to snare suspected illegal 
drug manufacturers. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that, in certain 
instances, pervasive use of such devices on a general basis might become 
problematic, but concluded that "if such dragnet type law enforcement 
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time 
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable."183 After Knotts, tracking signals from beepers and transponders 
has not generally required a warrant, because such tracking is not a search for 
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. No such dragnet has been perceived 
so far. 
On occasions when a physical trespass (such as breaking into a garage) 
is necessary to attach a beeper to a surveillance target's vehicle, some 
jurisdictions require warrants for the installation of electronic devices. 184 
Moreover, in Karo,185 decided a year after the Knotts decision, the United 
States Supreme Court limited the use of tracking devices to areas outside the 
home. According to the Court's opinion in Karo, monitoring a beeper 
becomes a search under the Fourth Amendment when it reveals "a critical fact 
about the interior" of a home that could not have been obtained by visual 
surveillance. 186 This home exception to otherwise lawful technologically 
enhanced searches was held to be consistent with the outdoors open-to-
observation rule noted in its later Kyllo decision. 187 
Approval of the use of beepers in tracking criminal suspects on roads and 
highways appears to follow the following bifurcated analysis: (i) If ordinary 
physical surveillance could have tracked a vehicle that is outside a house, 
electronic assistance in following that vehicle does not constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment. (ii) If the vehicle enters a home, tracking it is 
always a search requiring probable cause and a warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment. In other words, even when visual surveillance is lost or when 
sophisticated electronic tracking devices ate used in circumstances where 
visual surveillance is not possible (perhaps because law enforcement agents 
do not even know the general vicinity of the vehicle or suspect), the open-to-
183. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 284 (1983). The increasing routine use of tracking 
technologies described earlier in this article raises questions about whether the growing web of routine 
roadway surveillance is in fact becoming just such a dragnet. 
184. United States v. Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation, 
Monitoring, Maintaining, Repairing, & Removing of Elec. Transmitting Devices & Infra-Red Tracking 
Devices on or Within a White Ford Truck, 155 F.R.O. 401 (0. Mass. 1994). 
185. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984). 
186. [d. at 715. 
187. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27 (involving use of an infrared device to detect heat patterns in portions of 
a home used for growing marijuana). 
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observation rule allows tracking as long as what is tracked remains outside of 
a home. 188 When the log and recording functions of GPS devices provide 
different, and far more detailed records than visual surveillance could ever 
have provided, the same rule that what is out in the open can be tracked by 
technology continues to be applied by federal courts. For example, in United 
States v. McIver, 189 a case from Montana involving marijuana cultivation in 
a National Forest, the Ninth Circuit upheld the warrantless placement and use 
of electronic tracking devices on the undercarriage of McIver's Toyota 
4Runner parked in McIver's driveway. The vehicle was then tracked to a 
marijuana patch in the national forest where automatic cameras photographed 
the defendant harvesting marijuana. 
In the federal courts,just the possibility of being seen, rather than the fact 
of being seen by law enforcement agents is all that is necessary to avoid 
Fourth Amendment search restrictions. What law enforcement officials could 
have perceived with their ordinary senses from and in public locations is not 
considered a search at all. Camera surveillance of public places is usually 
justified on this basis as it was in McIver. 19o Moreover, the line of cases 
upholding license plate recognition as not impinging on reasonable 
expectations of privacy191 of people on roadways also follows this pattern of 
analysis. 
After the Knotts and Karo decisions, the Congress enacted the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) amending the original 
electronic surveillance statute, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act. The ECP A enacted two specific provisions with regard to electronic 
tracking devices. First, communications from electronic tracking devices (the 
"I am here" signals) are not protected as "electronic communications.,,192 
Second, the ECP A added a section (§ 3117) which both defines electronic 
tracking devices and provides for roving warrants to use such devices outside 
188. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (DEA agents repeatedly called 
a drug dealer's cellular telephone in order to generally locate the suspect within a wide metropolitan area.). 
189. 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 
190. See id. 
191. However, once a license plate number is connected with an individual, the privacy of the 
identification information is protected under Driver's Privacy Protection Act, discussed, infra. So far, courts 
in the United States have not yet considered the legality of pervasively tracking vehicle license plate 
numbers in an effort to track the whereabouts of a targeted individual or individuals. Since the technology 
to accomplish such tracking is available, use of it to follow the movements of individuals, as well as to 
identify people whose vehicles were in the vicinity of a particular location, such as a crime scene, is 
inevitable. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in the fall of 200 I, after the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon terrorist attacks, authorizes law enforcement access to a variety of facilities, including license 
plate readers, and records from them. 
192. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(12)(C) (2001). 
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the jurisdiction of the court authorizing installation of such a device. 193 
Subsequent court decisions, discussed above, have held that this statute does 
not limit the use of electronic tracking devices, but rather authorizes courts to 
expand their geographical scope. 194 
State Law Regarding Tracking People on Public Roads 
State court decisions are divided on whether a warrant is required to 
authorize law enforcement use of tracking devices. Some state courts have 
outright rejected the federal open-to-observation standard in evaluating the 
legality of law enforcement use of tracking devices. For example, in 1988, the 
Oregon Supreme Court concluded that "use of the radio transmitter [beeper] 
to locate defendant's automobile was a search .... Because the police did not 
have a warrant to use the transmitter, and because no exigency obviated the 
need to obtain a warrant, use of the transmitter violated defendant's rights 
under Article I, section 9" of the Oregon Constitution. 195 According to the 
Oregon Supreme Court, the principle that underlies the Oregon Constitution's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches requires a determination "whether 
the [beeper] practice, if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the government, 
will significantly impair 'the people's' freedom from scrutiny.,,196 The 
Oregon Court continued, 
[N]o movement, no location and no conversation in a "public place" 
would in any measure be secure from the prying of the government. 
There would in addition be no ready means for individuals to ascer-
tain when they were being scrutinized and when they were not. That 
is nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom.197 
For the Oregon court, unchecked law enforcement discretion to electronically 
track people on roadways would result in too much government power over 
individuals. It was therefore illegal without a warrant. 
In contrast, in 2002 the Supreme Court of Nevada approved the 
warrantless use of an electronic tracking device in a serial rape investigation 
that led to conviction the defendant's conviction of several offenses, including 
sex offenses, but not rape. The Nevada Supreme Court flatly concluded, 
"[W]e can see no objective expectation of privacy in the exterior of an auto-
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3117. 
194. United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753 (D. C. Cir. 2(00). 
195. State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988). 
196. ld. at 1048. 
197. /d. at 1049. The Supreme Court of Washington agreed that a warrant was necessary in State v. 
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2(03), but found that warrants had been secured in that case.ld. 
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mobile,"198 and followed the federal open-to-observation approach. The 
Nevada Supreme Court might have ruled differently, had it agreed with the 
Oregon Supreme Court that the issue should not be framed in narrow terms of 
reasonable expectations of privacy, but ratherin terms of the consequences of 
allowing too much power over individuals to be at the discretion of law 
enforcement agencies. Protecting the rights of citizens against government 
scrutiny, by requiring a warrant in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing, is an effective way to restrain that power and discretion. But the 
Nevada Supreme Court was willing to tolerate greater societal control over 
individuals in the form of law enforcement discretion to use electronic 
tracking devices. . 
Some states have enacted specific legislation that restricts the use of 
tracking-devices. As will be discussed more fully below, at least a half dozen 
states have specific statutes regulating the use of tracking devices. Several of 
these tracking device statutes, such as legislation in Oregon, Pennsylvania and 
Utah, establish a court order procedure for the installation and use of tracking 
devices by law enforcement. But they do not otherwise restrict the use of such 
devices. Other tracking device statutes, including those enacted by California, 
Hawaii, Tennessee and Texas sharply restrict the use of such devices, 
especially for purposes other than law enforcement. 
Each statute is somewhat different from the others. A typical state statute 
is California Penal Code section 637.7, which broadly prohibits "use [of] an 
electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a 
person," 199 without the consent of the registered owner of the vehicle on which 
the tracking device is installed. In enacting this criminal statute, the 
California legislature found and declared "that the right to privacy is funda-
mental in a free and civilized society and that the increasing use of electronic 
surveillance devices is eroding personal liberty . The Legislature declares that 
electronic tracking of a person's location without that person's knowledge 
violates that person's reasonable expectation of privacy.,,200 As originally 
introduced, the proposed legislation prohibited law enforcement use of elec-
tronic tracking devices; but, as enacted, the statute contains several excep-
tions, including one for "the lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a 
law enforcement agency.,,201 The statute defines an "electronic tracking 
device" as "any device attached to a vehicle or other movable thing that 
reveals its location or movement by the transmission of electronic signals."202 
198. Osburn v. State. 44 P.3d 523. 526 (Nev. 2(02). 
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7(a) (West 1999). 
200. 1998 Cal. Stat. 499. §1. 
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7(c). 
202. [d. § 637.7(d). 
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In addition to prosecution for a misdemeanor, violations of this statute can be 
grounds for the revocation of the business licence (e.g. that of a private 
investigator) of a person or entity illegally using such a device. There are no 
reported decisions construing California Penal Code section 637.7, although 
there are occasional press reports of arrests under this statute.203 The broad 
reach of the California tracking device statute potentially applies not only to 
conventional beepers and GPS devices, but also to almost any kind of device 
that tracks the location of a person or vehicle from one place to another. Even 
tracking the location of a person through cell phone signals or the DSRC on-
. board units recently approved by the FCC are potentially within the reach of 
this statute.204 
Moreover, other types of state statutes also affect the legality under state 
law of tracking people on public roads. Many of these statutes do not specifi-
cally focus on roadway surveillance, although they may apply in the roadway 
context. Perhaps the most obvious examples are stalking statutes, which may 
authorize damage actions as well as establish criminal liability for stalking. 
Most states have statutes that prohibit stalking. For example, California Civil 
Code section 1708.7 creates a damage liability for following, alarming or 
harassing a person who, as a result, fears for his or her safety or that of the 
person's family. 205 The Civil Code provision requires that the defendant have 
made credible threats with the intent to cause fear .. This statute includes threa-
tening by use of electronic communications-known as "cyberstalking.,,206 
The counterpart criminal statute is California Penal Code section 646.9, that 
describes a similar crime of stalking. 207 Such statutes can be used against 
those who physically follow other people, and could also be applied if on-road 
surveillance or telematics systems are used to harass or frighten a victim. 
Tort Liability for Interference with Privacy On the Open Road 
When people track other people on public roads, tort liability is also 
possible.208 Although decided cases with regard to such tort liability are fairly 
203. Police Arrest Suspect in Stalking of Woman, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2001, at A16. The article 
describes the arrest of a 42-year-old man for stalking and unlawfully using an electronic tracking device 
on a woman's car. The suspect was arrested "after a report of a someone tampering with a car. Officers 
found a sophisticated tracking device attached to the bottom of the vehicle, police said." ld. 
204. See discussion, supra note 59. 
205. SeeCALCIV.COOE§ 1708.7 (West 1998). 
206. See id. § 1708.7(b)(2) (West Supp. 2004). 
207. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9. Ohio statutes contain even more extensive provisions regarding the 
crime of Menacing by Stalking. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (Anderson 1996). 
208. The origins of common law protection for privacy in the United States date back to a famous 
1890 law review article, The Right to Privacy, largely written by Louis Brandeis, later a United States 
Supreme Court Justice. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99, at 205. The article described invasion of 
HeinOnline -- 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 354 2004
354 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
few and far between, tort law may apply to vindicate on-the-road privacy, 
particularly when some of the more advanced tracking technologies discussed 
in this article are used. Among the distinctive aspects of privacy tort actions 
is the feature that defendants do not have to have committed a physical 
trespass onto the plaintiffs property to be liable for invasion of privacy. A 
person does not necessarily have to be in a private or secluded place to sue for 
invasion of privacy. Nor is a privacy tort plaintiff required to be aware of the 
defendant's wrongful actions at the time an invasion of privacy takes place. 
As a result, the fact that the plaintiff was on a public road, or has not been 
physically touched by the defendant, or perhaps does not even know about the 
defendant at the time of the intrusion, does not foreclose liability for invasion 
of privacy. 
Indeed, defendants can be found liable for invading privacy of someone 
on a public road under each of the four categories of privacy torts outlined in 
the Restatement, Second, of Torts:209 
• Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, commonly referred to as 
"Intrusion ,,2\0 , 
• Appropriation of another's name or likeness, commonly referred 
to as "Appropriation,,,211 
• Unreasonable Publicity given to another's private life, com-
monly referred to as "Public Disclosure,,,212 and 
• Publicity unreasonably placing another person in a false light, 
commonly referred to as "False Light.,,213 
The most likely tort actions for invasion of privacy by tracking someone on 
public roads and highways would be for intrusion and for appropriation of 
name or likeness. 
The other two types of invasion of privacy torts-public disclosure214 and 
privacy as interference with an individual's "inviolate personality" and argued that the common law should 
allow damage actions to redress and punish invasions of privacy. See id. at 198, 205. See also Glancy, 
supra note 99, at 21-28. 
209. REsTATEMENT (SECONO) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1997) (adopted by the American Law 
Institute). These four privacy torts are "personal" in the sense that only the living individual whose privacy 
has been invaded has the right to bring a lawsuit based on them. [d. § 6521. Privacy tort actions are 
generally limited by absolute and conditional privileges similar to those applicable in defamation actions, 
such as consent and First Amendment protection for freedom of expression. [d. §§ 652F-652G. In most 
cases involving these privacy torts, liability requires the privacy invasion to have been unreasonable. 
210. [d. § 652B. 
211. [d. § 652C. 
212. REsTATEMENT (SECONO) OF TORTS § 652D. 
213. [d. § 652E. 
214. "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability 
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of the kind that (a) would be highly 
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false light215_are unlikely to be applicable in many roadway surveillance 
cases. Both require widespread publicity, not just disclosure or publication 
to another person as required under the law of defamation. Because both of 
these privacy torts contemplate media defendants, both are also sharply 
limited by First Amendment rights. The viability of tort actions against media 
defendants for public disclosure of private facts is especially questionable 
after Florida Star v. B.J.F.216 in which the United States Supreme Court made 
it practically impossible to succeed in such a suit against a media defendant. 
Similarly, the false light privacy tort has for a long time been on the short list 
of endangered torts, primarily because publication of false information is 
actionable as defamation.217 
Intrusion 
The intrusion privacy tort can vindicate a person's seclusion or reserve, 
even when the person is on a public road. The Restatement describes liability 
for "Intrusion Upon Seclusion:" 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." ld. § 652D. It is 
possible to imagine cases in which publicity regarding a person's travel patterns collected by traffic 
surveiJIance might be actionable. But such actions would be unlikely to be successful because disclosure 
of infonnation about a person's on-the-road activities is unlikely to be "highly offensive" to a reasonable 
person. For example, the broadcast of private toll account records showing twice-a-day trips over a 
particular bridge into another state might constitute a public disclosure of private facts. But just the leaking 
of the toll records, without publicity about them, would not constitute a public disclosure of private facts, 
even if the disclosure were highly offensive. Were a newspaper to publish a story containing the records, 
that would probably be protected as First Amendment activity, unless the story were false. If the feature 
story were false, then defamation might provide a surer remedy than invasion of privacy. 
215. "One who gives pUblicity to a matter considering another that places the other before the public 
in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which 
the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of 
or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other 
would be placed." ld. § 652E. One of the early United States Supreme Court decisions approving this aspect 
of the privacy tort involved a newspaper report of bridge disaster in which a highway fell into a chasm. 
Cantrell v. Forest City PubJ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 
One can imagine a case in which a toll tag or license plate recognition system showed a pattern 
of frequent travel by a car belonging to a religious leader or prominent citizen to and from an area of town 
known for prostitution or drug sales. The vehicle or toll tag had been used by someone other than the 
religious leader or prominent citizen. If later, a feature story described the .religious leader or prominent 
citizen as a "known frequenter of the red-light district," such a story could be characterized as a false light 
invasion of privacy, as well as defamatory. 
216. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
217. Diane LeenheerZimmennan, False Light lnvasionofPrivacy: The Light That Failed, 64N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 364 (1989). 
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subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.218 
This form of invasion of privacy is distinct from other forms of tortious 
invasion of privacy, because liability for intrusion does not depend on use of 
information. Rather, it involves interference with autonomy privacy interests. 
What makes a defendant liable for intrusion is that the defendant has 
"invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or 
affairs.,,219 Although the Restatement's discussion of intrusion tends to focus 
on private places, such as the home,220 the private seclusion vindicated by this 
tort is not limited only to the home. The tort explicitly includes protection for 
the seclusion of people out on the open road: "Even in a public place, how-
ever, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or 
lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be 
invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.,,221 The 
intrusion privacy tort enforces respect for matters that the particular individual 
reasonably considers personal and secluded. It is important to note that 
"unless the interference with the plaintiffs seclusion is a substantial one, of 
a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man," there 
is no liability for intrusion.222 Moreover, consent can also be a determinative 
issue in intrusion cases.223 
Court decisions have recognized that people on public roadways have 
rights to vindicate intrusions on their privacy. Perhaps the most famous of 
these intrusion decisions is GaZella v. Onassis224 in which a federal district 
court granted injunctive relief against a celebrity photographer (self-described 
as a "paparazzo," named after an annoying insect) who had followed, photo-
graphed and harassed Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and her children in public 
places such as streets, sidewalks and pathways. Ultimately, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals modified the injunction so as not to interfere with 
proper news coverage of the late President's wife and children.225 But the 
218. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 209. § 652B. 
219. [d. cmt. c. 
220. For example. the comment notes that wrongful intrusion does not ordinarily extend to observing 
or even taking the photograph of a plaintiff "while he is walking on the public highway. since he is not then 
in seclusion. and his appearance is public and open to the public eye." [d. 
221. [d. The illustration provided for the latter point is a photograph taken in an amusement house 
of a young woman whose skirts have been blown over her head by a concealed jet of compressed air. [d. 
illus.7. 
222. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 209. § 6528 cm!. d. 
223. [d. § 652F cm!. b. 
224. Galella v. Onassis. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) modified by 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
225. Galella v. Onassis. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). The modified injunction continued to prohibit 
approaching with in twenty-five feet of Mrs. Onassis "blocking of her movement in public places and 
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district court's finding of tortious intrusion on Mrs. Onassis and her children 
in public settings as an appropriate basis for injunctive relief remained un-
affected. Even though she chose to go out on the open road with her family, 
Mrs. Onassis did not impliedly consent to Galella's intrusions on her privacy. 
An earlier court decision based on intrusion protected the public 
activities of Ralph Nader. In Naderv. General Motors Corp. ,226 the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld against a motion to dismiss, Ralph Nader's complaint 
that agents of General Motors shadowed and kept him under surveillance, both 
physical and electronic, tracking him as he moved about on public roads and 
in public places. The court noted, "A person does not automatically make 
public everything he does merely by being in a public place .... ,,227 These 
cases, and others like them, stand for the proposition that persons in public 
settings, such as roadways, retain privacy rights vindicated by the intrusion 
tort. 
Fairly egregious facts tend to characterize cases in which plaintiffs have 
prevailed in intrusion privacy actions arising out of public roadway settings. 
After all, to be actionable under the Restatement, an intrusion must be "highly 
offensive to a reasonable person." For example, in Wolfson v. Lewis,228 a 
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against television 
reporters who shadowed the family of executives of a healthcare insurer.229 
Surveillance took the forms of closely following automobiles in which the 
executives or their families went to school or to work, and of using remote 
cameras, parabolic microphones and the like. The potential for violence, as 
security and safety fears mounted, prompted the judge to describe the 
defendants' actions as "hounding, harassing, intimidating and frightening con-
duct. ,,230 The court expressed particular concern about the "intrusion upon 
seclusion ... by electronic means such as wiretapping, photography or the use 
ofbinoculars.,,231 The fact that the intrusions had taken place in public did not 
undercut the plaintiffs's claims based on invasion of privacy by intrusion. 
In a somewhat different type of case, Hidey v. Ohio State Highway 
Patrol,232 an Ohio Court of Appeals found a viable intrusion upon seclusion 
thoroughfares." and any actions that would put her health and safety in jeopardy or would be likely "to 
harass. alann or frighten" her. [d. at 998. 
226. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970). 
227. [d. at 771. The court noted that there would be no intrusion into plaintiff s "private sphere" 
when "the plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal that fact to any casual observer." [d. Activities and 
details not observable by casual observers were subject to legal protection against intrusion. 
228. 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
229. [d. 
230. [d. at 1433. 
231. [d. at 1434. 
232. 689 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
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privacy claim on the part of a female passenger asked to leave a vehicle that 
had been stopped for speeding alongside an interstate highway. While the 
passenger stood along side the highway, the officer shined a flashlight down 
the front and back of her pants and then told her to partially disrobe in the 
back of the cruiser. The court ruled that, "What is underneath her clothing is 
private and a part of appellant's seclusion. The intrusion upon these private 
matters, especially while on the side of an interstate highway, would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person ... ."233 To the extent that routine traffic 
surveillance, whether by cameras or other electronic equipment, results in 
similar outrageous exposure, the tort of intrusion may well apply to vindicate 
the privacy of people along public roads and highways. 
One of the most interesting recent decisions upholding liability for 
intrusion in a highway setting is Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc.234 The case 
involved several types of privacy claims brought by automobile accident 
victims who, without their consent, were featured in a television report about 
the accident in which the plaintiffs were very badly injured. Although the 
decision in the case is complicated by multiple opinions and shifting 
majorities, the majority opinion's discussion of the intrusion tort "expresses 
the views of a majority of the court's members."235 In finding that, "It is in the 
intrusion cases that invasion of privacy is most clearly seen as an affront to 
individual dignity,,,236 the majority opinion quoted at length from the late 
Professor Edward Bloustein, who had warned, 
"[A] measure of personal isolation and personal control over the 
conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal 
freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means by these con-
cepts. . .. He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of 
the other and, in fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant. ,,237 
Although the court did not consider the accident scene (a ravine off the high-
way) to be private, the court found "two triable issues of intrusion on 
seclusion.,,238 First, the court found an "objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy" with regard to the interior of the rescue helicopter, which the court 
analogized to an ambulance or hospital room.239 Second, the court found a 
protectable privacy interest in the conversations between one of the accident 
victims and medical rescuers. Noting that there are no bright lines with regard 
233. [d. at 93. 
234. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). 
235. [d. at 475 n.2. 
236. [d. at 489. 
237. [d. (quoting Bloustein, supra note 100, at 973-74). 
238. [d. at 490. 
239. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490. 
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to such questions, the court held that the determination whether news gatherers 
"acted with highly offensive disrespect for ... personal privacy" in intrusion 
cases should be determined by juries in California. 240 
In a later case involving intrusion, a unanimous decision of the California 
Supreme Court approved protection of privacy expectations against intrusion 
in another type of public setting, an office.24I The court emphasized two 
required elements for an intrusion cause of action: "( 1) intrusion into a private 
place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable 
person."242 The first element requires that a plaintiff have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but does not require such a privacy expectation to be 
"of absolute or complete privacy.,,243 The court explained that for the 
purposes of the intrusion tort, there can be enforceable expectations of limited 
privacy in public settings. The court explained that privacy "is not a binary, 
all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal 
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one 
expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the 
expectation unreasonable as a matter of law.,,244 
Quoting from Professor Thomas McCarthy, the court noted that, '''Like 
'privacy,' the concept of 'seclusion' is relative. The mere fact that a person 
can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally 
be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone. ",245 The court noted that 
determining whether an area is one of limited seclusion is properly a factual 
issue for a jury or other fact-finder to decide. In intrusion cases, "the 
reasonableness of a person's expectation of visual and aural privacy depends 
not only on who might have been able to observe the subject interaction, but 
on the identity of the claimed intruder and the means of intrusion."246 The 
court also noted that, "We do not suggest that the same standards necessarily 
apply to private intrusions as to government searches, or vice versa.,,247 
According to the California Supreme Court, the notion of reasonable privacy 
expectations in tort law is distinct from the contentious reasonable expectation 
of privacy concepts under federal search and seizure law. 
Whether routine surveillance of activities along public roads would rise 
240. [d. at 494-95. 
241. Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (involving an investigative reporters use of a hidden 
microphone and camera in investigating a telepsychic business from inside the offices of that business). 
242. [d. at 71. 
243. [d. 
244. [d. at 72. 
245. [d. (quoting THOMASJ.McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10(A)(2) (2d 
ed. West Group 2(00)). 
246. Sanders, 978 P.2d at 77. 
247. [d. at 74 n.3. 
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to the level of tortious intrusion is uncertain. What is likely is that intrusion 
cases brought in California will often withstand demurrer and summary 
judgment motions. They are likely to be ultimately decided by juries in 
California. Particularly egregious factors, such as using a traffic surveillance 
camera to capture activities in buildings adjacent to the roadway or to peer 
into vehicles and perhaps look at a driver's clothing or lack thereof, or at the 
emotional state of passengers in vehicles or at the text of their reading 
materials, could be types of roadway surveillance that might well result in 
liability. Under the standards established for intrusion actions by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, it would be up to ajury to decide whether the context was 
sufficiently private and whether the intrusion was highly offensive. 
Appropriation 
Privacy rights to prevent appropriation of an individual's name or 
likeness248 can apply to people in vehicles. In Motschenbacher v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco CO.,249 the Ninth Circuit held that legal protection for "an 
individual's proprietary interest in his own identity," was available when a 
cigarette company used distinctive features of a famous race car driver's 
vehicle in a television commercial for cigarettes without the car owner's 
permission.250 Even though the appearance of the race car was slightly altered, 
its distinguishing features were still apparent. These features caused viewers . 
to believe that the car was being driven by the celebrity race car driver, who 
was in fact in the car when the altered photograph was taken but was not 
visible in the photograph. 
When vehicles, or their travel patterns, are similarly associated with 
particular persons, and such things are used for advertizing purposes, there 
appears to be potential liability for the appropriation of personal identity. 
Most of the reported court decisions regarding tort liability for invasion of 
privacy by appropriation involve commercial use of a person's name or 
likeness in advertising. For example, liability for appropriation might result 
from the image of a vehicle driver or perhaps of a bicyclist or pedestrian, 
captured by a remote camera or photo radar, when the image was later used 
in commercial advertizing without the consent of the person involved. 
The law enforcement surveillance systems described above are not now 
used to collect or to distribute information for advertizing purposes. But some 
of the advanced ITS technologies, particularly those involving vehicles 
equipped with location devices and on-board communication units, make it 
248. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. supra note 209. § 652C. 
249. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
250. [d. at 825. 
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possible to collect a data image of an individual's movements and decisions, 
sometimes called a user profile. Such a data profile has substantial 
commercial value. Because these data images or user profiles of travel 
patterns are extremely valuable for marketing purposes, there have been a 
number of suggestions for applying the appropriation privacy tort to data 
collection.2S1 For example, Professor Andrew McClug has made an extended 
argument for applying the appropriation privacy tort in situations involving 
dossiers of consumer data, data mining and consumer profiling.252 He 
suggests focusing on appropriation rights that vindicate the identity and 
personal dignity rights of non-famous ordinary individuals. After all these 
appropriation cases vindicate interference with individual self-determination, 
and are fundamentally different from the property-based actions that vindicate 
celebrities's ownership of their publicity rights.253 In the non-celebrity cases, 
individual identity and dignity rights can be vindicated by the appropriation 
privacy tort. 2S4 Such rights associated with autonomy privacy interests can 
also be infringed by mass data collection, data mining and consumer profiling. 
Such appropriation privacy tort protections may also apply to the personal 
travel patterns of individuals captured by advanced roadway tracking systems 
described in this article. Legislative recognition that ordinary individuals have 
such privacy rights that include proprietary control over information about 
251. Recent scholarly writing asserts ownership of information derived from individuals. For 
example, in The Architecture of Privacy, Professor Lawrence Lessig maintains that people own data of 
which they are the subject, or source. Lawrence Lessig. The Architecture of Privacy, I V AND. J. ENT. L. 
& PRAC. 56 (1999). His widely-acclaimed book, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, makes a 
similar argument. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE (1999). However, aside 
from particular legislation requiring individual consent to the use of certain types of information about a 
person and tort rights protecting the publicity rights of celebrities, United States law has up to now not often 
recognized such ownership theories. Other academic lawyers, such as Professor Pamela Samuelson. have 
argued that control over information about a person is better protected through a licensing system, similar 
to that which applies regard to trade secrets. See Pamela Samuelson. Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 
52 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (2000). Even academic speculation has tended to stop short of asserting privacy 
rights to refuse participation in anonymous data collection. See also Janet Dean Gertz. Comment, The 
Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 943 (2002); 
Jessica Litman, Information Privacyflnformation Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1283 (2000). 
252. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to 
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 63 (2003). 
253. The United States Supreme Court approved such an appropriation right for a person who 
performed a human canon ball act in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See, 
e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 
1339 (D.NJ. 1981). 
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 652C explains in comment b that appropriation 
liability "is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the 
plaintiff s name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, 
and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS. supra note 209, § 652C cm!. b. Three of the illustrations involve impersonation. See id. iIIus. 
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their driving patterns is evidenced in the vehicle "black box" legislation 
discussed below. 255 
State Constitutional Privacy Guarantees 
Aside from protections against unreasonable searches and seizures256 
discussed above, Federal Constitutional law does not offer general privacy 
protections against roadway surveillance. Nor has the United States Constitu-
tion been applied to restrict gathering or use of personal information.257 How-
ever, state constitutional law is quite different. In fact, some state constitu-
tions offer important protections for the privacy of people on the open road. 
About ten state constitutions contain provisions expressly guaranteeing a right 
of privacy.258 Other state constitutions have been interpreted to contain an 
implied privacy right. 259 Many of these state constitutional privacy protections 
apply to both public and private sector entities,260 as well as to both collectors 
and transferees of personal information. So far, these specific constitutional 
privacy guarantees have not yet been applied to tracking people on roadways, 
although state constitutional restrictions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures are the basis for restricting the use of tracking devices discussed 
above.26I 
It may be useful to point out that at least one type of out-in-the-open 
roadway-related activity has been protected by some state constitutional 
privacy rights. That activity is leaving trash on the curbside for removal by 
sanitation workers .. The United States Supreme Court does not recognize 
privacy rights in trash left on the curbside to be removed by refuse 
collectors.262 But several state supreme courts have protected such privacy 
rights as a matter of state constitutional privacy law.263 These cases might be 
extended from trash on the roadside to cars on the roadway, for example, 
when remote highway sensors are used to collect data about vehicle tailpipe 
emissions. 
255. See discussion infra note 322. 
256. See text discussion supra notes 130-66. 
257. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
258. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, llIinois, Louisiana, Montana, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia. 
259. These states include Arkansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and perhaps Iowa. 
260. The Alaska, California, Hawaii, llIinois, and Louisiana constitutions provide that their privacy 
guarantees apply to private-sector as well as public-sector invasions of privacy. 
261. See discussion supra notes 195-97. 
262. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
263. The states in which state constitutional privacy rights protect privacy in these circumstances 
inciudeCalifomia, Hawaii, New Jersey, Washington, and perhaps Indiana, where the interrnediateappellate 
courts are divided on the issue. 
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The California constitutional protection for privacy was among the 
earliest of these state constitutional privacy provisions. For over thirty years, 
the Constitution of the State of California has explicitly guaranteed an 
"inalienable right to privacy" in Article I, § 1. This constitutional privacy right 
was adopted in a 1972 initiative campaign in which concerns about collection 
and misuse of infonnation about individuals were prominent reasons for the 
measure's adoption. Because under California law ballot arguments are used 
to interpret legislative intent with regard to initiative measures, it is useful to 
consider the potential application of this constitutional privacy right to 
collection and use of infonnation about people's activities on the open road: 
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. . .. It prevents 
government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling 
unnecessary infonnation about us and from misusing infonnation 
gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to 
embarrass us. . . . The average citizen also does not have control over 
what infonnation is collected about him. Much is secretly collected 
. . .. Modem technology is capable of monitoring, centralizing and 
computerizing this infonnation which eliminates any possibility of 
individual privacy. [California's Constitutional privacy right is 
designed to] prevent misuse of this infonnation for unauthorized 
purposes and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous 
infonnation.264 
Under this Constitutional provision, both public-sector and private-sector 
interferences with privacy are lawful only if they are justified by a very 
important societal interest. Whether combating traffic congestion, or collect-
ing travel patterns of everyone who takes a certain route, or locating potential 
terrorist suspects would qualify as such very important societal interests has 
not yet been decided. 
No reported decision has directly addressed the application of this 
constitutional privacy right to roadway surveillance. But the California 
Supreme Court has enforced this constitutional privacy right in the context of 
surveillance of public activities. In White v. Davis265 the California Supreme 
Court upheld a taxpayer's complaint, brought under California Civil 
Procedure Code section 526a, seeking an injunction against expenditure of 
public funds for covert police surveillance of university classes and other 
264. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION- PROPOS mONS AND PROPOSED LAws TOGETHER 
WITH ARGUMENTS - GENERAL ELECflON, TuESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 27, 28. 
265. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975). 
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public activities at the University of California at Los Angeles.266 Justice 
Tobriner presented the case as raising two questions: 
[First:] Do the state and federal Constitutions pennit police officers, 
posing as students, to enroll in a major university and engage in the 
covert practice of recording class discussions, compiling police 
dossiers and filing "intelligence" reports, so that the police have 
"records" on the professors and students? [Second:] Is this "intelli-
gence gathering" by the police covering discussions in university 
classes and in public and private meetings of university-sponsored 
organizations, constitutionally valid when such reports "pertain to no 
illegal activity or acts?,,267 
The answer to each of these questions was a resounding "no." Only a showing 
of compelling state interest could justify such a surveillance regime. 
Perhaps the court's sharp reaction to the surveillance in White was 
affected by factual allegations that included: "extensive, routine, covert police 
surveillance of university classes and organization meetings" that the court 
described as "unprecedented in our nation's history."268 But the court also 
pointed to "routine stationing of covert, undercover police agents in university 
classrooms and association meetings, both public and private." The Court 
held that such routine surveillance "constitutes 'government snooping' in the 
extreme.,,269 Since it was alleged "that the information gathered by the under-
cover agents from class discussion and organization meetings 'pertains to no 
illegal activity or acts, '" the court sunnised "that the gathered material, 
preserved in 'police dossiers,' may be largely unnecessary for any legitimate 
. . . governmental interest.,,270 Whether similar covert collection of 
information (e.g., dossiers in the form of itineraries) of law-abiding people on 
the open road would evoke a similar response has yet to be decided. 
In a later decision interpreting the California state constitutional privacy 
guarantee, the court reaffirmed that the California constitutional right to 
privacy applies broadly to all sorts of both governmental and nongovernmental 
actors-Big Brother and Big Sister from the public sector, as well as the little-
brothers from the private sector. In Hill v. NCAA,27 1 the California Supreme 
Court sharply distinguished the circumstances in White and ruled that most 
California state constitutional privacy actions against nongovernmental 
266. [d. at 226. 
267. [d. at 224. 
268. [d. at 235. 
269. [d. at 234. 
270. White, 533 P.2d at 234. 
271. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (upholding drug testing of student athletes under an NCAA anti-drug 
program). 
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privacy invasions simply require a balancing of competing societal interests. 
The California Supreme Court also provided guidance for such balancing in 
outlining the elements of a cause of action for invasion of the state 
constitutional right to privacy: "(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by 
defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.,,272 The decision also 
recognizes defenses to this cause of action in the form of competing interests 
that derive from "legally authorized and socially beneficial activities of 
government and private entities."m Enforcing the California constitutional 
right to privacy can present a fairly daunting task for plaintiffs who seek to 
fulfill each of these requirements. 
With regard to showing a legally protected privacy interest, it is useful 
to bear in mind that the California Supreme Court explained in Hill, supra: 
Whatever their common denominator, privacy interests are best 
assessed separately and in context. Just as the right to privacy is not 
absolute, privacy interests do not encompass all conceivable 
assertions of individual rights. Legally recognized privacy interests 
are generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the 
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information 
("informational privacy"); and (2) interests in making intimate 
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without 
observation, intrusion, or interference ("autonomy privacy").274 
As noted above, roadway surveillance potentially affects both types oflegally 
protected privacy interests. These interests involve both information privacy 
interests in precluding misuse of information regarding one's location, as well 
as autonomy interests in not having one's activities on the road scrutinized and 
information about them collected without one's consent. The court in White 
was particularly concerned about the ways in which surveillance of public 
activities affects autonomy interests and can affect, and sometimes chill, 
personal decisions. 
In the context of ITS, information collected by roadway surveillance in 
the form of anonymous traffic flow information used in traffic management 
does not involve personally identifiable information at all. Such information 
only becomes personally identifiable when it is associated with a vehicle 
owner through a vehicle license plate or a toll tag identifier. A comprehensive 
data could of course connect an identified individual's itineraries with other 
types of information about the individual -- such as name, address, social 
272. [d. at 675. 
273. [d. at 656. 
274. [d. at 654. 
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security number, purchases with credit cards, law enforcement information, 
other locations visited, and information about associates. In such circum-
stances, the California state constitution would probably be interpreted to 
recognize a much stronger privacy interest. 
Second, under Hill, a cause of action for invasion of the state constitu-
tional right to privacy also requires a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the circumstances. As, the California Supreme Court explained in Hill, "A 
'reasonable' expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on 
broadly based and widely accepted community norms.'>275 Among the 
"customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities" 
that "create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy," the court notes 
particularly "the presence or absence of opportunities to consent voluntarily 
to activities impacting privacy interests.,,276 As a result, the open circum-
stances of travel on public roads might appear to signify a sort of implied 
waiver of privacy expectations.277 And yet even though most travel activities 
on the open road are open to observation, constitutionally protected expecta-
tions of privacy have been protected even in relatively open places. For 
example, in a public university in White278 and in a public office in Sanders,279 
the impact of the surveillance on individual privacy was determined to be too 
great. 
The third element of a cause of action for interference with the California 
state constitutional right to privacy requires that, "Actionable invasions of 
privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or 
potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms 
underlying the privacy right.',280 As the California Supreme Court noted in 
Hill, "No community could function if every intrusion into the realm of 
private action, no matter how slight or trivial, gave rise to a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy.,,281 With regard to roadway surveillance, social norms 
regarding collection of information about individuals are only beginning to 
emerge. In some cases, such as roadway stops, the norms seem to be clear. 
But in other types of cases, particularly with regard to technologically 
advanced surveillance that tracks people on public roadways, the public norms 
275. [d. at 655. 
276. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655. 
277. For example, in People v. Stanley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), the District Court 
of Appeal held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the amount of electricity entering a 
person's home that was measured surreptitiously by a box installed by the electric company on a public 
utility pole outside the defendant's house. [d. 
278. White, 533 P.2d at 222. 
279. Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (also an intrusion privacy tort action). 
280. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655. 
281. [d. 
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are much less clear. One source of privacy norms applicable to roadway 
surveillance would be the privacy principles of the Intelligent Transportation 
Society of America discussed above.282 
Even when a cause of action for interference with the state constitutional 
right to privacy has satisfied the above three elements, there remains an 
opportunity to again balance privacy interests against competing societal 
interests. This balancing occurs through the defenses discussed at length in 
Hill: 
The diverse and somewhat amorphous character of the privacy right 
necessarily requires that privacy interests be specifically identified 
and carefully compared with competing or countervailing privacy and 
nonprivacy interests in a "balancing test." The comparison and 
balancing of diverse interests is central to the privacy jurisprudence 
of both common and constitutional law . 283 
Various types of roadway surveillance would involve balancing different 
competing societal purposes: Law enforcement roadway surveillance systems 
serve traffic 'and law enforcement purposes. ITS traffic management systems 
serve such societal interests as traffic safety, environmental protection, as well 
as preventing traffic congestion. Some of the private-sector telematics 
systems may serve less weighty societal interests, such as consumer 
convenience, advertising and the like. Such interests would be balanced along 
with the privacy interests in determining whether there is too much societal 
control over the individual. 
Two related factors - lack of choice and government coercion - tend to 
tip the balance toward a finding of unconstitutional privacy interference. The 
California Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted on the importance of choice: 
If, for example, a plaintiff claiming a violation of the state 
constitutional right to privacy was able to choose freely among 
competing public or private entities in obtaining access to some 
opportunity, commodity, or service, his or her privacy interest may 
weigh less in the balance. In contrast, if a public or private entity 
controls access to a vitally necessary item, it may have a 
correspondingly greater impact on the privacy rights of those with 
whom it deals.284 
When ITS traffic management systems collect origin-destination data without 
the knowledge or consent of the person being tracked, the person is deprived 
282. See discussion supra note 107. 
283. Hill. 865 P.2d at 655. 
284. Id. at 657. 
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of any choice. On the other hand, if drivers can choose to travel toll roads 
anonymously, as is the case with regard to certain Canadian toll roads,285 
choice is restored. When travelers are informed about the collection of origin-
destination data and given the opportunity to consent or not to the use of data 
about their travels, privacy interferences are mitigated. Moreover, the 
California Supreme Court has expressed repeated concern that "the pervasive 
presence of coercive government power in basic areas of human life typically 
poses greater dangers to the freedoms of the citizenry than actions by private 
persons.,,286 When law enforcement agents surreptitiously attach a tracking 
device to a vehicle, coercive government action causes increased concern 
about privacy. 
Aside from forming the basis for litigation against both public-sector and 
private-sector invasions of privacy, the California Constitutional privacy 
guarantee has also played a role in forestalling efforts to gain discovery of 
personal location information. For example in Planned Parenthood Golden 
Gate v. Superior Court, 287 Justice Haerle held that the state constitutional right 
to privacy outweighed the interest in requiring disclosure of the names and 
residential addresses of Planned Parenthood's staff and volunteers who were 
not parties to the litigation. The litigation was over anti-abortion protestors's 
rights to protest outside an abortion-provider's facility. The court found that 
"a privacy interest does not need to be violated before it can be acknowledged . 
. . . [R]ecent history teaches that the consequences of disclosure of private 
information about these individuals can be dire.,,288 In response to a 
suggestion that "individuals do not have strong privacy interests in their 
residential addresses and telephone numbers because such information is 
routinely disclosed during discovery and is often accessible by other means," 
Justice Haerle replied that in the particular context at issue there was "a very 
. strong privacy interest in avoiding disclosure."289 
As discussed above, all state constitutions specifically prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures. In some instances courts have found state 
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures to prohibit 
use of electronic tracking devices without a warrant.290 The Oregon Supreme 
Court even found that the Oregon constitution protects "freedom from 
285. See, e.g., 407 Toll Route: How You Can Travel the 407 Anonymously, Infonnation and Privacy 
Commissioner website, at http://www.ipc.on.calscriptslindex_.asp?action=31&N_IO=I&P_1O=11353&U 
_ID=O (last visited Aug. 11, 2004). 
286. Hill, 865 P.2d at 656. 
287. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
288. [d. at 640. 
289. [d. at 641, 643. In vacating the trial court's discovery order, the Court of Appeal even rejected 
the use of a protective order with regard to private data identifying the location of individuals. [d. at 645. 
290. See discussion supra notes 195-97. 
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scrutiny.,,29I Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court concluded "that the 
citizens of this State have a [constitutional] right to be free from the type of 
governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a 
citizen's vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to advances 
in technology.,,292 . 
Statutes Restricting Roadway Surveillance 
Concerns about privacy on the open road have generated a remarkably 
varied group of statutes that address particular privacy problems posed by 
specific types of roadway surveillance. Categorizing these statutes is difficult 
because the legislation tends to respond to particular concerns about potential 
invasions of privacy by specific types of technology. Because federal statutes 
apply more widely than the legislation of anyone state, it makes sense to first 
discuss some of the relevant federal legislation and then tum to some of the 
much more numerous and various state statutes. 
Federal Statutes 
The original legislation that established the Intelligent Transportation 
Systems program required the program to be developed in light of concerns 
about privacy. 293 The United States Department of Transportation, through 
the Federal Highway Administration and the ITS Joint Program Office 
continues to support and to fund ITS programs in the spirit of this mandate. 
Not only is federal funding for ITS projects typically contingent on properly 
taking account of privacy; in addition, the Intelligent Transportation Society 
of America (formerly the designated advisory committee to the Department 
of Transportation on ITS issues) developed the privacy principles noted earlier 
which the Society recommends be followed by all of its members.294 As a 
result, recognition of privacy interests are woven into almost every aspect of 
ITS programs. 
At a more specific level, the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act295 
(DPPA) restricts state departments of motor vehicles, and others who sell and 
disclose information from state departments of motor vehicles databases, from 
disclosing personal information about a driver without the driver's consent. 
The United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld this privacy mandate 
291. State v. Campbell. 759 P.2d 1040. 1048 (Or. 1988) 
292. State v. Jackson. 76 P.3d 217. 224 (Wash. 2003). 
293. Pub. L. No. 102-240. 105 Stat. 2189. § 6054. See Nonnan Y. Mineta. Transportation. 
Technology and Privacy. 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 3 (1995). 
294. See discussion supra note 107. 
295. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2001). 
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against a federalism challenge based on the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments 
in Reno v. Condon. 296 The Supreme Court ruled that the Driver's Privacy 
Protection Act was legislation of general application that "regulates the 
universe of entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle 
information-the States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate 
commerce and private resellers or redisclosers of that information in 
commerce. ,,297 
The DPPA restricts the availability of personal information identifying 
an individual without the consent of the individual. Personal information 
protected under the statute includes information that identifies an individual, 
such as "an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identifica-
tion number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code) telephone number, 
and medical or disability information, but does not include information on 
vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status.,,298 An even more 
carefully protected category of "highly restricted personal information" 
includes the "individual's photograph or image, social security number, 
medical or disability information."299 Specific provisions restrict the use and 
disclosure of such information both by state motor vehicle licensing 
authorities and by those who use information derived from official driver's 
license records. The DPPA specifically restricts reuse of information about 
drivers that was collected for licensing purposes. Without the written consent 
of the driver, information about a driver cannot be used for other purposes. 
Passage of the statute was stimulated in part by notorious cases of stalkers 
who murdered victims whose addresses had been obtained through requests 
for DMV records.3°O 
In addition, federal electronic surveillance laws protect the content of 
wireless communications to and from vehicles against unlawful interception. 
Special procedures are established for law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies to access these communications under specified circumstances.301 
The USA PATRIOT Act, noted above, has significantly expanded the ability 
of law enforcement and intelligence agencies both to intercept the content of 
communications through electronic surveillance and to access a wide variety 
296. 528 U.s. 141 (2000). 
297. Id. at 151. 
298. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3). 
299. Id § 2725(4). 
300. According to Senator Barbara Boxer, The Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2721-2725, was prompted by the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the hit television series, 
"My Sister Sam." See 139 CONGo REc. S15745-01, 515762 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer). But there 
were other notorious cases as well. See also Ellen Barry, Killer's Dreams Bared on the Internet N.H. Man 
Took to Web to Boast and to Stalk, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1999, at B I. 
301. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
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of business records, such as those containing location information held by 
communications providers. 
Because the United States Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740 (1979) that restrictions on electronic surveillance did not apply 
when the government used a pen register to record numbers dialed from a 
telephone, no warrant is required for similar interceptions of to-from 
information in the context of wireless communications. Moreover, as noted 
above, in 1986 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act exempted 
electronic tracking devices from the restrictions on electronic surveillance in 
18 U.S.c. § 2510 and added 18 U.S.c. § 3117 to specifically authorize courts 
to permit use of electronic tracking devices beyond the court's geographical 
jurisdiction. As noted earlier, this section places few restraints on the use of 
electronic tracking devices and simply recognizes courts' authority to permit 
the monitoring of these devices across jurisdictions. 
The potential for tracking the locations of wireless communications 
devices some of which are attached to or carried in vehicles, caused Congress 
to require that automatic location identification (ALI) not be used for tracking 
wireless communications device users, other than for emergency response 
purposes.302 A separate statute, the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2522 and 47 U.S.c. §§ 229, 1001-1010, 
facilitates law enforcement access to this location information.303 Indeed, 
Congressional concerns about potential misuse of automatic location identifi-
cation (ALI) are reflected in 47 U.S.c. § 222 designed to protect the privacy 
of location information obtained by wireless carriers. Federal law protects 
this location information against disclosure by wireless carriers both generally 
under § 222(a)304 as well as under § 222(c) as customer proprietary network 
information (CPNI).305 However, the precise meaning of this privacy protec-
tion remains somewhat opaque after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals struck 
down FCC rules interpreting the statute to require affirmative choice (opt-in) 
by subscribers regarding disclosure of CPNI by wireless users in United States 
West, Inc. v. FCC306 
As federal telecommunications laws now stand, 47 U.S.c. § 222 governs 
the privacy of cellular telephone customer information. The statute places a 
duty on telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of customer 
information: 
302. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2001). 
303. Cell phone records have been successfully used as evidence in criminal cases. United States v. 
Forest. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
304. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a). 
305. [d. § 222(c). 
306. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). em. denied. 530 U.S. 1213 (2000) (vacating on First 
Amendment grounds a FCC orner restricting wireless carriers from using and disclosing CPNI). 
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A telecommunications carrier that receives. or obtains [CPNI] 
proprietary information from another carrier for purposes of providing 
any telecommunications service shall use such information only for 
such purpose, and shall not use such information for its own 
marketing efforts. 307 
With regard to wireless location information, 47U.S.C. § 222(f) requires 
"express prior authorization of the customer" before "use or disclosure of or 
access to-( 1) call location information concerning the user of a commercial 
mobile service,,308 other than in accordance with emergency notification 
services as provided under 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(4). Under 47U.S.C. § 
222(h)(1) customer proprietary network information (CPNI) includes "infor-
mation that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, 
location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by 
any customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to 
the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer 
relationship. ,,309 
However, under 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(3) "[a] telecommunications carrier 
that receives or obtains customer proprietary network information by virtue 
of its provision of a telecommunications service may use, disclose, or permit 
access to aggregate customer information" for purposes other than provision 
of telecommunications service or services necessary to the provision of such 
service.310 "Aggregate information" is defined in 47 U.S.c. § 222(h)(2) as 
"collective data that relates toa group or category of services or customers, 
from which individual customer identities and characteristics have been 
removed.,,311 As a result of this complex legislation, location information is 
routinely collected by wireless telecommunications providers. Access to this 
information depends on the nature of the user, the consent of the wireless 
subscriber and the purposes for which the location information is used. 
The recently adopted FCC order allocating bandwidth for Dedicated 
Short Range Communications in ITS Applications, discussed above,312 is 
intended to facilitate inclusion of wireless radio communications devices in 
new vehicles (OBUs) and installation of communications nodes along road-
sides (RSUs). One could argue that, since these OBUs are wireless 
telecommunications devices, that information from them should be treated in 
307. 47 U.S.C. § 222(b). 
308. [d. § 222(f). 
309. [d. § 222(h)(I). 
310. [d. § 222(c)(3). 
311. [d. § 222(h)(2). 
312. See discussion supra note 59. 
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the same way as location infonnation from wireless telephones which is 
protected as CPNI. However, the new ITS Rule and Order, noted above, says 
nothing about protecting the privacy of DSRC users. As a practical matter, 
some of the DSRC technology, particularly the geographically limited stand-
alone roadside units, might not be treated as interstate telecommunications 
carriers under federal law and, as a result, not CPNI. In short, considerable 
uncertainty remains about the privacy of the new ITS communications 
applications. 
State Legislation. 
In contrast with the generally permissive federal laws regarding privacy 
on roadways, state statutes designed to protect privacy on the open road tend 
to offer more privacy protection, although there is considerable variation. For 
example, the state statutes regulating electronic tracking devices discussed 
above313 offer considerably more protection for roadway privacy than 
applicable federal statutes. 
Several states have enacted legislation restricting photo radar and red 
light cameras described above.314 One of the first such statutes was" enacted 
by New Jersey in 1992.315 The prohibition is direct and unequivocal: "Not-
withstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, a law enforcement 
officer or agency shall not use photo radar to enforce the provisions of [traffic 
regulations] ..•. "316 The Utah statute's prohibition on photo radar is subject 
to exceptions, such as allowing use of photo radar in school zones. The Utah 
statute also requires posting of warning signs and requires local option before 
radar is used.317 The Oregon statute only authorizes photo radar in seven 
specified municipalities which can decide whether or not to use photo radar. 
The Oregon statute also requires signs warning of the use of photo radar, 
limited hours of use and a number of other restrictions.318 Nevertheless, photo 
radar remains widely used in the United States, aside from the states where 
these statutory restri~tions apply. 
313. See discussion supra notes 200-03. 
314. Five states appear to have statutes that specifically address the use of photo radar: California, 
New Jersey, Utah, Wisconsin, and Oregon. 
315. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-103.1 (West 2002). California and Wisconsin also prohibit use of photo 
radar in speed enforcement. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.6(c) (West 2(00); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.02(3)(b) 
(West 2(00). 
316. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-103.1(a). 
317. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-52.5 (1998). 
318. OR. REV. STAT. § 810.438 (2003). 
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Other state statutes address misuse of remote cameras. A California 
statute has recently authorized an action for "constructive invasion of privacy" 
under California Civil Code section 170S.S(b): 
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the 
defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a 
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other 
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial 
activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory 
enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, 
if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not 
have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory 
enhancing device was used.319 
Using electronic devices to capture images of personal or family activities is 
grounds for civil liability in California, even when there is no physical 
trespass on the property of the victim. Misuse of remote cameras to probe the 
interiors of apartments along the highway would appear to violate this statute. 
Since the concept of constructive invasion of privacy protects all areas where 
one has "a reasonable expectation of privacy," such areas could potentially 
include the interiors of vehicles, particularly mobile homes, on the open road. 
The most recent, and in many ways the most interesting, example of state 
legislative restrictions on roadway surveillance technology is what is called 
"black box" legislation restricting the availability of infonnation from the 
computer diagnostic modules described, supra.320 A recently enacted 
California Statute, Vehicle Code section 9951 provides that any new motor 
vehicle manufactured on or after July I, 2004 that is sold or leased in 
California and is "equipped with one or more recording devices commonly 
referred to as 'event data recorders (EDR)' or 'sensing and diagnostic modules 
(SDM),' shall disclosure that fact in the owner's manual.,,32I The statute 
covers devices that record such factors as the vehicle's speed and direction, 
the history of where the vehicle has traveled, vehicle steering perfonnance, 
use and perfonnance of breaks, or the driver's use (or not) of a seatbelt. It 
also covers any device that has the capacity to transmit infonnation about an 
accident in which the vehicle has been involved to a central receiving system 
when an accident occurs.322 Such "black box" infonnation is routinely 
319. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West Supp. 2004). 
320. See discussion supra notes 45-49. 
321. CAL. VEH. CODE § 995 1 (a) (West Supp. 2004). 
322. [d. § 9951(b). 
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downloaded by insurance companies and vehicle manufacturers for use in 
determining the causes of and liability for accidents. 
The statute also restricts data derived from such devices. "Black box" 
data cannot legally be downloaded or otherwise retrieved by anyone other than 
the registered owner of the vehicle, except with the consent of the vehicle 
owner. However, the data can be produced in response to a lawful court 
order. It can also lawfully be used for motor vehicle safety research, provided 
that the identity of the registered owner or driver are not disclosed. 
Automotive technicians are permitted access to "black box" for the purposes 
of servicing or repairing the vehicle, but are restricted from releasing the data. 
The statute also specifically requires that telematics subscription services 
(such as OnStar, discussed above) disclose their capacity to record or transmit 
vehicle diagnostic information as part of their SUbscription services. 
So far, California is the only state to establish that a vehicle owner or 
driver is the owner of vehicle diagnostic information. To the extent that this 
data-ownership model is extended to other types of information derived from 
the activities of people on the open road, protection for the privacy interests 
of roadway users will be further reinforced. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The principle that people on the open road have the right to control 
information about their on-the-road activities underlies the recent California 
Statute regarding onboard black box diagnostic units just discussed. Such a 
principle also contributes to many of the other types of privacy rights 
discussed in this article. Returning control over information about the 
activities of people on public roads and highways to the individuals who are 
the subjects of that information is an appropriate and effective strategy for 
protecting autonomy and information privacy interests of people on the open 
road. 
Respect for the individual person and insistence on each person's rights 
to dignity and self-determination underlie the laws that protect the privacy of 
people on public roads and highways. These laws protect both autonomy 
privacy rights concerned with where an individual can freely choose to go and 
also information privacy rights to control collection and disclosure of 
information collected about the individual's whereabouts. 
A half-century ago, Justice William O. Douglas described privacy 
interests as radiating out from the individual in concentric circles: 
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression 
of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality. 
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Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life 
respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the 
education and upbringing of children. 
Third is the freedom to care for one's health ~d person, freedom 
from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf. 323 
It is to this outer edge of privacy interests, that this article has directed 
attention. 
Out there on the open road, important privacy interests are worthy of 
recognition and protection. Examining these outlying privacy interests in light 
of advances in technologies designed to continuously keep track of everyone's 
whereabouts spotlights some of the privacy rights that have been out there on 
the open road all along, perhaps unseen and unappreciated. 
323. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
